Own money, open competition? Local revenue autonomy, EU funds and procurement integrity in Polish municipalities
Abstract Fiscal decentralisation is often expected to improve local government because officials who spend money raised from their own residents have stronger reasons to buy at low cost. Whether this logic extends to the way public contracts are awarded has rarely been tested with municipal data. This study documents conditional associations in a panel of about 2,200 Polish municipalities between 2008 and 2019, relating the composition of local revenue and the share of EU-financed capital spending to three procurement integrity indicators: single bidding, non-open procedures and a composite risk index. Two-way fixed-effects estimates do not support the view that revenue autonomy promotes open competition. Associations are small and mixed, close to zero for local taxes, and modestly positive for non-tax own revenue and non-open procedures. EU capital spending is associated with more single bidding, particularly where own revenue is high, although this interaction is exploratory and absent in the later sample. Timing tests, placebo leads, measurement diagnostics and robustness exercises suggest that the results are not artefacts of contract matching, although identification remains observational. Fiscal autonomy alone does not secure competitive procurement, and the source of local money matters. JEL Classification: H72 , H77 , D73 , R50
Authors
- Quoc Lap Nguyen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-3316-686X)
Institutions
- University of Economics and Law (VN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Research Square
- Published
- 2026-11-17
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11597766/v1
- Primary Topic
- Local Government Finance and Decentralization
- Type
- preprint