Humpty Dumpty Epistocracies: Democratic Inclusion, Public Ignorance and the Structural Instability of Epistocracy

Abstract Epistocrats argue that public ignorance justifies epistocratic interferences with our political decisions to protect and promote the common good. In response, this paper shows that inclusive democracy is a more structurally stable institutional response to public ignorance than exclusionary epistocracy, whether justified with instrumentalist, paternalistic or jury defences. A Robust Political Economy framework helps to show why epistocracy is fragile. Epistocrats see that informed knowers are competent, but overlook that they are highly unrepresentative, which makes empowering them structurally unstable. An ignorant public does not know that the knowers are competent and lacks a peaceful way to oust unrepresentative politicians from power. This creates a competence/stability dilemma: either epistocracy prioritises a competent politics that fails to represent ignorant citizens and compromises stability, or epistocracy prioritises a stable politics that represents ignorant citizens but compromises the competence that epistocracy promises. This turns the democracy/epistocracy debate away from competence and towards institutional stability and feasibility. The problem is not that the public is too ignorant for democracy, but that the public may be too ignorant for epistocracy.

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Publication Details

Journal
Res Publica
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-026-09805-7
Primary Topic
Political Theory and Democracy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Humpty Dumpty Epistocracies: Democratic Inclusion, Public Ignorance and the Structural Instability of Epistocracy

Richard Beadon Williams
Res Publica
Political Theory and Democracy
article

Humpty Dumpty Epistocracies: Democratic Inclusion, Public Ignorance and the Structural Instability of Epistocracy

Richard Beadon Williams
article en

Abstract

Abstract Epistocrats argue that public ignorance justifies epistocratic interferences with our political decisions to protect and promote the common good. In response, this paper shows that inclusive democracy is a more structurally stable institutional response to public ignorance than exclusionary epistocracy, whether justified with instrumentalist, paternalistic or jury defences. A Robust Political Economy framework helps to show why epistocracy is fragile. Epistocrats see that informed knowers are competent, but overlook that they are highly unrepresentative, which makes empowering them structurally unstable. An ignorant public does not know that the knowers are competent and lacks a peaceful way to oust unrepresentative politicians from power. This creates a competence/stability dilemma: either epistocracy prioritises a competent politics that fails to represent ignorant citizens and compromises stability, or epistocracy prioritises a stable politics that represents ignorant citizens but compromises the competence that epistocracy promises. This turns the democracy/epistocracy debate away from competence and towards institutional stability and feasibility. The problem is not that the public is too ignorant for democracy, but that the public may be too ignorant for epistocracy.

Res Publica
Technical University of Munich (DE)
European Commission, Technische Universität München
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Political Theory and Democracy
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