Time, Evidence, and Redress: Collective Antitrust Enforcement Between Brazil´s Constitutional Economic Order and Law and Economics

Private antitrust enforcement in Brazil reveals a persistent tension between the institutional capacity to investigate infringements of competition law and the procedural conditions under which injured parties may obtain compensation. Law No. 14,470/2022 sought to address this tension by establishing specific limitation rules, introducing double damages for certain infringements, regulating aspects of evidentiary burdens and leniency-related liability, and recognizing the capacity of decisions issued by the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) to support evidence-based interim relief. This article examines these developments through the interaction of constitutional economic principles, collective civil procedure, and law and economics. Drawing on the procedural scholarship of Kazuo Watanabe and Nelson Nery Júnior and the economic frameworks developed by Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi, Gary Becker, and Steven Shavell, it argues that time, evidence, and collective procedural organization are interdependent dimensions of effective judicial redress. The study employs a doctrinal and analytical methodology based on statutory interpretation, selected decisions of Brazil's Superior Court of Justice, and theoretical comparison. It proposes that procedural effectiveness in antitrust litigation requires institutional coordination without automatic judicial deference, appropriate responses to information asymmetries without unrestricted burden shifting, and collective mechanisms capable of addressing dispersed harm without disregarding individual elements of civil liability. Economic analysis is employed to illuminate the consequences of legal arrangements, not to displace constitutional safeguards. The resulting framework conceives private antitrust enforcement as a problem of constitutional procedural design rather than merely one of increasing damages or litigation.

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Publication Details

Journal
OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints)
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/edyj8_v1
Primary Topic
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Type
preprint
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Time, Evidence, and Redress: Collective Antitrust Enforcement Between Brazil´s Constitutional Economic Order and Law and Economics

Luiz Carlos Nacif Lagrotta
OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints)
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
preprint

Time, Evidence, and Redress: Collective Antitrust Enforcement Between Brazil´s Constitutional Economic Order and Law and Economics

Luiz Carlos Nacif Lagrotta
preprint en

Abstract

Private antitrust enforcement in Brazil reveals a persistent tension between the institutional capacity to investigate infringements of competition law and the procedural conditions under which injured parties may obtain compensation. Law No. 14,470/2022 sought to address this tension by establishing specific limitation rules, introducing double damages for certain infringements, regulating aspects of evidentiary burdens and leniency-related liability, and recognizing the capacity of decisions issued by the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) to support evidence-based interim relief. This article examines these developments through the interaction of constitutional economic principles, collective civil procedure, and law and economics. Drawing on the procedural scholarship of Kazuo Watanabe and Nelson Nery Júnior and the economic frameworks developed by Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi, Gary Becker, and Steven Shavell, it argues that time, evidence, and collective procedural organization are interdependent dimensions of effective judicial redress. The study employs a doctrinal and analytical methodology based on statutory interpretation, selected decisions of Brazil's Superior Court of Justice, and theoretical comparison. It proposes that procedural effectiveness in antitrust litigation requires institutional coordination without automatic judicial deference, appropriate responses to information asymmetries without unrestricted burden shifting, and collective mechanisms capable of addressing dispersed harm without disregarding individual elements of civil liability. Economic analysis is employed to illuminate the consequences of legal arrangements, not to displace constitutional safeguards. The resulting framework conceives private antitrust enforcement as a problem of constitutional procedural design rather than merely one of increasing damages or litigation.

OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
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