Jev-as-a-Reward: Validating Probabilistic Safety Judges for Reinforcement Learning

Probabilistic safety judges return the probability of a safety label and cheaply score reinforcement learning rollouts. A confidence gate sends only uncertain verdicts to a stronger LLM judge, which leaves confidently passed harm in a blind spot. Policies can exploit this blind spot, and commercial judges release new versions. We propose a protocol that validates such a judge before and during training, separates the share of confidently passed harm from its amount, and re-validates it after each judge change. We apply it to two versions of Jev, a commercial decision-only judge, and to an open guard classifier. Under the probability reward of Jev, passed harm shrinks in all 11 runs under the primary reference, mostly more slowly than caught harm, and concentrates in the blind spot. Binarizing this judge meets the escape criterion on Llama, and the open guard classifier shows an escape signal in one seed under a second reference. Guard classifiers share this blind spot, and even frontier LLM judges catch at most one of 10 human-labeled confident misses. Without a trained reward model, the probability reward with a helpfulness term lowers HarmBench attack success on Llama-3.1-8B from 0.287 to at most 0.033 at the final checkpoint.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.20955
Primary Topic
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
Type
preprint
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preprint

Jev-as-a-Reward: Validating Probabilistic Safety Judges for Reinforcement Learning

Dongsuk Oh, Eunkyeong Lee, Junhyung Moon, Seunggwan Hong
arXiv (Cornell University)
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
preprint

Jev-as-a-Reward: Validating Probabilistic Safety Judges for Reinforcement Learning

Dongsuk Oh, Eunkyeong Lee, Junhyung Moon, Seunggwan Hong
preprint en

Abstract

Probabilistic safety judges return the probability of a safety label and cheaply score reinforcement learning rollouts. A confidence gate sends only uncertain verdicts to a stronger LLM judge, which leaves confidently passed harm in a blind spot. Policies can exploit this blind spot, and commercial judges release new versions. We propose a protocol that validates such a judge before and during training, separates the share of confidently passed harm from its amount, and re-validates it after each judge change. We apply it to two versions of Jev, a commercial decision-only judge, and to an open guard classifier. Under the probability reward of Jev, passed harm shrinks in all 11 runs under the primary reference, mostly more slowly than caught harm, and concentrates in the blind spot. Binarizing this judge meets the escape criterion on Llama, and the open guard classifier shows an escape signal in one seed under a second reference. Guard classifiers share this blind spot, and even frontier LLM judges catch at most one of 10 human-labeled confident misses. Without a trained reward model, the probability reward with a helpfulness term lowers HarmBench attack success on Llama-3.1-8B from 0.287 to at most 0.033 at the final checkpoint.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
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