When Tool Names Are Not Identities: Measuring Provider Misbinding in MCP-Based AI Agents

Large language model (LLM) applications increasingly act as agents that select and invoke external tools. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes this interaction by allowing clients to compose tools advertised by multiple servers. However, tool metadata used for discovery and selection is not, by itself, necessarily bound to a verified provider identity. This paper studies this gap as tool-provider misbinding: a failure in which a request intended for a legitimate provider is instead resolved to an attacker-controlled tool. The attacker does not compromise the host, LLM, legitimate server, or network channel; it only operates another MCP server that advertises tools with chosen metadata. We formulate tool provider misbinding as an attacker-controlled tool-selection optimization problem and evaluate it in a controlled MCP environment across five LLM-based clients. The results show that interactions drive misbinding. The strongest failures occur when exact-name collision, task-aligned description, and compatible schema reinforce one another, but authority-enhanced descriptions with compatible schema can also cause wrong-provider execution or unresolved provider ambiguity without name collision. Different models expose the same provider-binding weakness differently, including attacker-controlled provider selection, clarification requests, and unstable or inconsistent provider resolution.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.21577
Primary Topic
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
Type
preprint
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preprint

When Tool Names Are Not Identities: Measuring Provider Misbinding in MCP-Based AI Agents

Ali Akbar Ghorbani, Sajjad Dadkhah, Zeynab Anbiaee
arXiv (Cornell University)
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
preprint

When Tool Names Are Not Identities: Measuring Provider Misbinding in MCP-Based AI Agents

Ali Akbar Ghorbani, Sajjad Dadkhah, Zeynab Anbiaee
preprint en

Abstract

Large language model (LLM) applications increasingly act as agents that select and invoke external tools. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes this interaction by allowing clients to compose tools advertised by multiple servers. However, tool metadata used for discovery and selection is not, by itself, necessarily bound to a verified provider identity. This paper studies this gap as tool-provider misbinding: a failure in which a request intended for a legitimate provider is instead resolved to an attacker-controlled tool. The attacker does not compromise the host, LLM, legitimate server, or network channel; it only operates another MCP server that advertises tools with chosen metadata. We formulate tool provider misbinding as an attacker-controlled tool-selection optimization problem and evaluate it in a controlled MCP environment across five LLM-based clients. The results show that interactions drive misbinding. The strongest failures occur when exact-name collision, task-aligned description, and compatible schema reinforce one another, but authority-enhanced descriptions with compatible schema can also cause wrong-provider execution or unresolved provider ambiguity without name collision. Different models expose the same provider-binding weakness differently, including attacker-controlled provider selection, clarification requests, and unstable or inconsistent provider resolution.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
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