Strategic Repayment and Latent Fragility in Financial Networks: Why Banks Withhold Payable Liquidity

A network in which every bank pays in full can nevertheless admit a self-fulfilling settlement freeze under the same balance-sheet fundamentals. Thus, observing full repayment does not establish the uniqueness or robustness of the payment equilibrium. We derive this result from a precautionary-liquidity choice: banks may delay otherwise feasible payments to insure an interim funding need, trading a positive settlement-discipline cost against the marginal value of retained cash. The optimal reserve is a critical quantile of future liquidity requirements, and the repayment rule nests Eisenberg-Noe maximal feasible clearing exactly. Counterparty underpayment both reduces current cash and raises desired reserves. We characterise network amplification and the conditions for coexistence, including a homogeneous two-bank GPD frontier in which interbank exposure and maximum funding pass-through enter through one dimensionless index. A two-date settlement accounting rule distinguishes payment timing from ultimate default. The main result concerns equilibrium coexistence; the conditional best-response adjustment diagnostic does not assign selection probabilities.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.21262
Primary Topic
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
Type
preprint
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
preprint

Strategic Repayment and Latent Fragility in Financial Networks: Why Banks Withhold Payable Liquidity

Hicham El Kaissi
arXiv (Cornell University)
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
preprint

Strategic Repayment and Latent Fragility in Financial Networks: Why Banks Withhold Payable Liquidity

Hicham El Kaissi
preprint en

Abstract

A network in which every bank pays in full can nevertheless admit a self-fulfilling settlement freeze under the same balance-sheet fundamentals. Thus, observing full repayment does not establish the uniqueness or robustness of the payment equilibrium. We derive this result from a precautionary-liquidity choice: banks may delay otherwise feasible payments to insure an interim funding need, trading a positive settlement-discipline cost against the marginal value of retained cash. The optimal reserve is a critical quantile of future liquidity requirements, and the repayment rule nests Eisenberg-Noe maximal feasible clearing exactly. Counterparty underpayment both reduces current cash and raises desired reserves. We characterise network amplification and the conditions for coexistence, including a homogeneous two-bank GPD frontier in which interbank exposure and maximum funding pass-through enter through one dimensionless index. A two-date settlement accounting rule distinguishes payment timing from ultimate default. The main result concerns equilibrium coexistence; the conditional best-response adjustment diagnostic does not assign selection probabilities.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Laika access coming soon