Refund Without Return: A Three-Stage Game of Platform Rules, Opportunism and Product Quality
A refund-without-return rule shifts the cost of a return from buyer to seller. Advocates expect quality to rise; critics point to sellers who lose both the money and the goods. We model the policy as a three-stage game of complete information: the platform sets rule strength, a seller sets price and quality, and buyers decide whether to purchase and then whether to claim. Because a claim succeeds only with probability equal to rule strength, the share of satisfied buyers for whom claiming pays rises with rule strength: a tougher rule manufactures the opportunism that defeats it. The threshold below which quality improves therefore falls as the rule is strengthened, and the quality-maximising rule is interior and declining in opportunism. The price response also changes sign: absent opportunism a tougher rule raises price; once claiming pays it lowers price, because a high list price is itself the inducement to claim. Welfare rises with rule strength, but the gain accrues almost entirely to consumers while seller profit falls by more than two-fifths; and since the platform pays to process claims, its privately optimal rule falls well short of the social one.
Authors
- Jiakai Liu
Institutions
- University Town of Shenzhen (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Frontiers in Business Economics and Management
- Published
- 2026-11-16
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.54097/v04d3a89
- Primary Topic
- Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00