Who Pays for Scarcity? Pay Floors, Surge Pricing and Waiting Times in New York City Ride-Hailing

Abstract Dynamic pricing transfers scarcity rents, but to whom? New York City regulates a per-trip minimum for ride-hail driver pay, so the answer depends on where trips sit relative to that minimum. Using 239,470,448 completed high-volume for-hire trips in 2024, we document four facts. First, in a restricted sample covering about 76% of trips, mostly shorter and cheaper ones, recorded pay clusters tightly around a benchmark reconstructed from the TLC’s published rates: in April, 63.9% of Uber and 40.0% of Lyft trips are paid within $0.05 of it, and 64.2% and 67.7% within $0.10. The platform ranking reflects the tolerance, because Lyft pays on a schedule about 0.4% above the TLC rates; these are proximity measures, not verified legal binding or compliance. Second, recorded driver pay moves with the base fare far less than one for one: the conditional within-cell slope is about 0.26 for Uber and 0.20 for Lyft. Third, a censored regression of pay on the floor and the fare puts the floor near-binding on about 60% of sampled Uber trips and, using Lyft’s own estimated pay schedule, on about 77% of sampled Lyft trips, with roughly half of each additional fare dollar reaching the driver above the floor. Fourth, around 93 NBA game endings, the arena-core-minus-outer gap rises by $7.48 to $18.41 in fares, $6.72 to $10.37 in recorded driver pay and 2.2 to 2.9 minutes in pickup waits relative to two hours earlier, with larger changes for Uber; but 47% to 67% of the fare change is already present before the ending, the step from the quarter hour before to the quarter hour after is $3.87 to $8.47 in fares, and time-of-day drift is not ruled out, so we read these as co-movement around a predictable pulse, not as causal effects. A stylized floor-plus-share model shows how a pay floor can make driver pay flat in the fare for some trips. The public records do not reveal surge multipliers, a validated trip-level legal floor or platform net revenue. A matched non-event-day comparison and a sample-flow audit are specified in Appendix A and are not yet reported. JEL classification: L11, L51, J30, R41, D43

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Publication Details

Journal
Research Square
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11722750/v1
Primary Topic
Digital Economy and Work Transformation
Type
preprint
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preprint

Who Pays for Scarcity? Pay Floors, Surge Pricing and Waiting Times in New York City Ride-Hailing

Patrick Nyenkan
1 links
Research Square
Digital Economy and Work Transformation
preprint

Who Pays for Scarcity? Pay Floors, Surge Pricing and Waiting Times in New York City Ride-Hailing

Patrick Nyenkan
preprint en

Abstract

Abstract Dynamic pricing transfers scarcity rents, but to whom? New York City regulates a per-trip minimum for ride-hail driver pay, so the answer depends on where trips sit relative to that minimum. Using 239,470,448 completed high-volume for-hire trips in 2024, we document four facts. First, in a restricted sample covering about 76% of trips, mostly shorter and cheaper ones, recorded pay clusters tightly around a benchmark reconstructed from the TLC’s published rates: in April, 63.9% of Uber and 40.0% of Lyft trips are paid within $0.05 of it, and 64.2% and 67.7% within $0.10. The platform ranking reflects the tolerance, because Lyft pays on a schedule about 0.4% above the TLC rates; these are proximity measures, not verified legal binding or compliance. Second, recorded driver pay moves with the base fare far less than one for one: the conditional within-cell slope is about 0.26 for Uber and 0.20 for Lyft. Third, a censored regression of pay on the floor and the fare puts the floor near-binding on about 60% of sampled Uber trips and, using Lyft’s own estimated pay schedule, on about 77% of sampled Lyft trips, with roughly half of each additional fare dollar reaching the driver above the floor. Fourth, around 93 NBA game endings, the arena-core-minus-outer gap rises by $7.48 to $18.41 in fares, $6.72 to $10.37 in recorded driver pay and 2.2 to 2.9 minutes in pickup waits relative to two hours earlier, with larger changes for Uber; but 47% to 67% of the fare change is already present before the ending, the step from the quarter hour before to the quarter hour after is $3.87 to $8.47 in fares, and time-of-day drift is not ruled out, so we read these as co-movement around a predictable pulse, not as causal effects. A stylized floor-plus-share model shows how a pay floor can make driver pay flat in the fare for some trips. The public records do not reveal surge multipliers, a validated trip-level legal floor or platform net revenue. A matched non-event-day comparison and a sample-flow audit are specified in Appendix A and are not yet reported. JEL classification: L11, L51, J30, R41, D43

Research Square
Texas Tech University (US)
Reduced inequalities, Sustainable cities and communities
Digital Economy and Work Transformation
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