Baryonic Keys and the Inheritance of Crypto-Assets: Revisiting the Tales From the Crypt Protocol

The inheritance of crypto-assets faces a structural obstacle: ownership is the knowledge of a key, so the key either disappears with its owner or has to be shared beforehand. The Tales From the Crypt Protocol (TFCP) addressed one part of the problem, the distributed and privacy-preserving acknowledgment of a death by a blockchain. We revisit it with a new primitive. A \emph{baryonic key} is a physical object from which bits are obtained only through a measurement, are never stored digitally, and which exists in exactly $n$ copies, where $n$ is neither zero nor unbounded. We define the primitive, outline a candidate instantiation based on a replicated micro-fractured relief, and state its limits: digitising a copy is slow and tamper-evident, not impossible. We also outline other uses of the primitive, from post-quantum pre-shared keys to common coins for Byzantine agreement. We then give a threat model for TFCP, review the attack models of the literature that apply to it, and show where it resists and where it does not. We propose TFCP-B, in which decrypting the will requires both a secret shared among registrars and the response of a baryonic key, and in which heirs claim their share through hash commitments, without any prior key or wallet. We detail each change from TFCP to TFCP-B, with its rationale and its price. TFCP-B removes the anonymity loss caused by colluding registrars and blocks several false-alarm attacks. It does not remove the shallow-account attack, remains exposed to transaction censorship during the deliberation period, and introduces new assumptions on custodians and reading devices. The security arguments are informal and the physical figures are design estimates.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.20782
Primary Topic
Cryptography and Data Security
Type
preprint
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
preprint

Baryonic Keys and the Inheritance of Crypto-Assets: Revisiting the Tales From the Crypt Protocol

Frédéric Prost
arXiv (Cornell University)
Cryptography and Data Security
preprint

Baryonic Keys and the Inheritance of Crypto-Assets: Revisiting the Tales From the Crypt Protocol

Frédéric Prost
preprint en

Abstract

The inheritance of crypto-assets faces a structural obstacle: ownership is the knowledge of a key, so the key either disappears with its owner or has to be shared beforehand. The Tales From the Crypt Protocol (TFCP) addressed one part of the problem, the distributed and privacy-preserving acknowledgment of a death by a blockchain. We revisit it with a new primitive. A \emph{baryonic key} is a physical object from which bits are obtained only through a measurement, are never stored digitally, and which exists in exactly $n$ copies, where $n$ is neither zero nor unbounded. We define the primitive, outline a candidate instantiation based on a replicated micro-fractured relief, and state its limits: digitising a copy is slow and tamper-evident, not impossible. We also outline other uses of the primitive, from post-quantum pre-shared keys to common coins for Byzantine agreement. We then give a threat model for TFCP, review the attack models of the literature that apply to it, and show where it resists and where it does not. We propose TFCP-B, in which decrypting the will requires both a secret shared among registrars and the response of a baryonic key, and in which heirs claim their share through hash commitments, without any prior key or wallet. We detail each change from TFCP to TFCP-B, with its rationale and its price. TFCP-B removes the anonymity loss caused by colluding registrars and blocks several false-alarm attacks. It does not remove the shallow-account attack, remains exposed to transaction censorship during the deliberation period, and introduces new assumptions on custodians and reading devices. The security arguments are informal and the physical figures are design estimates.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Cryptography and Data Security
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Laika access coming soon