RS-2026-105: The Defence Is the Attack Surface: Weaponising Security Controls in Agentic AI Systems

Agentic AI security has concentrated investment on the model and the agent: prompt injection, jailbreaks,guardrail bypass, alignment. This paper argues that the more consequential shift is that attackers areincreasingly going through defensive controls rather than around them. We identify five dependencyclasses present in any agentic defence stack — volume, resources, model, human, and managementplane — and present a demonstrated subversion technique for each, drawn from controlled testing in anair-gapped laboratory. We show that each technique requires no novel exploit: only the abuse of a control'sown privileged function. We then argue that existing AI security frameworks do not test for this class ofattack because they assume the detection layer is operational. We propose a control-plane integrity modelbased on out-of-band attestation, fail-closed defaults, and recorded blind spots, and we conclude that theassignability of liability in AI security incidents depends on it.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24304831
Primary Topic
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
Type
preprint
Controls
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preprint

RS-2026-105: The Defence Is the Attack Surface: Weaponising Security Controls in Agentic AI Systems

Red Specter Security Research
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
preprint

RS-2026-105: The Defence Is the Attack Surface: Weaponising Security Controls in Agentic AI Systems

Red Specter Security Research
preprint en

Abstract

Agentic AI security has concentrated investment on the model and the agent: prompt injection, jailbreaks,guardrail bypass, alignment. This paper argues that the more consequential shift is that attackers areincreasingly going through defensive controls rather than around them. We identify five dependencyclasses present in any agentic defence stack — volume, resources, model, human, and managementplane — and present a demonstrated subversion technique for each, drawn from controlled testing in anair-gapped laboratory. We show that each technique requires no novel exploit: only the abuse of a control'sown privileged function. We then argue that existing AI security frameworks do not test for this class ofattack because they assume the detection layer is operational. We propose a control-plane integrity modelbased on out-of-band attestation, fail-closed defaults, and recorded blind spots, and we conclude that theassignability of liability in AI security incidents depends on it.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
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