Coerced but “Authorised”: Allocating Loss in India's Digital Arrest Frauds and the Case for a Statutory Reimbursement Regime

In a “digital arrest” fraud, callers posing as police, customs or central-agency officers convince a victim over video that she is under investigation and must move her savings into a “verification” account to avoid arrest. The victim makes the transfers herself. That single fact has shaped how Indian law allocates the loss. Because the payment is authenticated by the customer, it falls outside the “unauthorised transaction” framework that has governed bank liability since 2017, and the victim usually bears the whole loss. This paper examines whether that allocation can be defended and what should replace it. It combines doctrinal analysis of the Reserve Bank of India’s 2017 Circular, the Responsible Business Conduct Third Amendment Directions, 2026, consumer law and the Supreme Court’s continuing suo motu proceedings with analysis of official data placed before Parliament and the Court, and a comparative study of the United Kingdom, the European Union, Singapore and Australia. Reported digital-arrest losses rose from ₹91.14 crore in 2022 to ₹1,935.51 crore in 2024, and the average reported loss per complaint rose from about ₹22,800 to about ₹1.57 lakh. The 2026 Directions bring coerced payments within the definition of a fraudulent transaction, but a coerced customer who took reasonable care falls under none of their liability rules, and their compensation mechanism covers only negligent customers’ losses of up to ₹50,000, once in a lifetime, for a single year. The paper argues that coercion is not negligence, that banks are the cheapest avoiders of this loss, and that the bank hosting the mule account should share it. It proposes a statutory Coerced Payment Reimbursement Scheme built on a presumption of reimbursement, an equal split between sending and receiving banks, a meaningful cap and a narrow gross-negligence exception.

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Journal
International Journal of Law Management & Humanities
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.63108/ijlmh.13253
Primary Topic
Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies
Type
article
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article

Coerced but “Authorised”: Allocating Loss in India's Digital Arrest Frauds and the Case for a Statutory Reimbursement Regime

Syed Aadil Rizvi
1 links
International Journal of Law Management & Humanities
Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies
article

Coerced but “Authorised”: Allocating Loss in India's Digital Arrest Frauds and the Case for a Statutory Reimbursement Regime

Syed Aadil Rizvi
article en

Abstract

In a “digital arrest” fraud, callers posing as police, customs or central-agency officers convince a victim over video that she is under investigation and must move her savings into a “verification” account to avoid arrest. The victim makes the transfers herself. That single fact has shaped how Indian law allocates the loss. Because the payment is authenticated by the customer, it falls outside the “unauthorised transaction” framework that has governed bank liability since 2017, and the victim usually bears the whole loss. This paper examines whether that allocation can be defended and what should replace it. It combines doctrinal analysis of the Reserve Bank of India’s 2017 Circular, the Responsible Business Conduct Third Amendment Directions, 2026, consumer law and the Supreme Court’s continuing suo motu proceedings with analysis of official data placed before Parliament and the Court, and a comparative study of the United Kingdom, the European Union, Singapore and Australia. Reported digital-arrest losses rose from ₹91.14 crore in 2022 to ₹1,935.51 crore in 2024, and the average reported loss per complaint rose from about ₹22,800 to about ₹1.57 lakh. The 2026 Directions bring coerced payments within the definition of a fraudulent transaction, but a coerced customer who took reasonable care falls under none of their liability rules, and their compensation mechanism covers only negligent customers’ losses of up to ₹50,000, once in a lifetime, for a single year. The paper argues that coercion is not negligence, that banks are the cheapest avoiders of this loss, and that the bank hosting the mule account should share it. It proposes a statutory Coerced Payment Reimbursement Scheme built on a presumption of reimbursement, an equal split between sending and receiving banks, a meaningful cap and a narrow gross-negligence exception.

International Journal of Law Management & HumanitiesVol. 9(VI)
National University of Study and Research in Law (IN)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies
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