Fee-for-Service and Its Discontents: A Health Economics Analysis of US Provider Payment Incentives

In recent decades, the U.S. has spent more on healthcare compared with other developed countries. This paper discusses how the major Fee-for-Service payment model contributes to this paradox through its impacts on American provider payment incentives. Based on secondary data from OECD Statistics, CMS national health accounts, and some literatures, this study analyzes the health economics of U.S. provider payment incentives. This paper focuses specifically on three channels through which FFS drives up costs: over-treatment, supplier-induced demand, and administrative cost. This paper finds that FFS payment model tends to prioritize the volume of healthcare services rather than their value, which may cause excessive spending through over-treatment, supplier-induced demand, and high administrative costs. Although Medicare has made efforts to shift toward value-based payment models, FFS remains the dominant payment method in private insurance. The drawbacks of FFS suggest that the barriers to payment reform are not solely technical but are also affected by political and institutional factors. Therefore, reforming healthcare payment systems should not be viewed as a one-time process. Rather, it requires continuous efforts to ensure that financial incentives for healthcare providers are aligned with the interests and well-being of patients.

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Publication Details

Journal
Theoretical and Natural Science
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.54254/2753-8818/2027.39207
Primary Topic
Healthcare Policy and Management
Type
article
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article

Fee-for-Service and Its Discontents: A Health Economics Analysis of US Provider Payment Incentives

Zixuan Luo
1 links
Theoretical and Natural Science
Healthcare Policy and Management
article

Fee-for-Service and Its Discontents: A Health Economics Analysis of US Provider Payment Incentives

Zixuan Luo
article en

Abstract

In recent decades, the U.S. has spent more on healthcare compared with other developed countries. This paper discusses how the major Fee-for-Service payment model contributes to this paradox through its impacts on American provider payment incentives. Based on secondary data from OECD Statistics, CMS national health accounts, and some literatures, this study analyzes the health economics of U.S. provider payment incentives. This paper focuses specifically on three channels through which FFS drives up costs: over-treatment, supplier-induced demand, and administrative cost. This paper finds that FFS payment model tends to prioritize the volume of healthcare services rather than their value, which may cause excessive spending through over-treatment, supplier-induced demand, and high administrative costs. Although Medicare has made efforts to shift toward value-based payment models, FFS remains the dominant payment method in private insurance. The drawbacks of FFS suggest that the barriers to payment reform are not solely technical but are also affected by political and institutional factors. Therefore, reforming healthcare payment systems should not be viewed as a one-time process. Rather, it requires continuous efforts to ensure that financial incentives for healthcare providers are aligned with the interests and well-being of patients.

Theoretical and Natural ScienceVol. 206(1)
Good health and well-being
Healthcare Policy and Management
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