Instrumenting Failure: Scoring Language Model Agents at Every Decision Node in Imperfect-Information Games

Agent evaluations report task success and rarely say what an agent did at each decision. We score every decision node of three 12B to 14B instruct-tuned language models (LMs) playing five zero-sum imperfect-information games against four opponents on eight properties from decision and game theory, five of them against a CFR+ equilibrium reference. At each node, the LM also states a belief about the opponent's hidden state in a separate call. Without memory and at temperature 0, stated beliefs sit 0.250 to 0.288 in total variation distance from the equilibrium posterior, and where the action responds to the state its agreement with that belief exceeds chance by -0.04 to 0.19. The two calls frame the opponent differently, so the result is a behavioural inconsistency and makes no claim about internal beliefs. Under one prompt and greedy decoding, the LM's action never varies with the state in 10 of the 38 cells where the reference varies its own. Memory lowers the constant-action share in 9 of 13 testable ladders at temperature 0; at temperature 0.2 the cells at 1 fall from 16 to 5 of the 46 informative cells, while the belief results hold. A gate withholds, with a stated reason, any belief score the run cannot support, and seven of the eight non-zero defect rates are attributable to the instrument, a representation, or the LMs.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.20644
Primary Topic
Artificial Intelligence in Games
Type
preprint
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preprint

Instrumenting Failure: Scoring Language Model Agents at Every Decision Node in Imperfect-Information Games

Alan Blair, Sonit Singh, Michael Kingston
arXiv (Cornell University)
Artificial Intelligence in Games
preprint

Instrumenting Failure: Scoring Language Model Agents at Every Decision Node in Imperfect-Information Games

Alan Blair, Sonit Singh, Michael Kingston
preprint en

Abstract

Agent evaluations report task success and rarely say what an agent did at each decision. We score every decision node of three 12B to 14B instruct-tuned language models (LMs) playing five zero-sum imperfect-information games against four opponents on eight properties from decision and game theory, five of them against a CFR+ equilibrium reference. At each node, the LM also states a belief about the opponent's hidden state in a separate call. Without memory and at temperature 0, stated beliefs sit 0.250 to 0.288 in total variation distance from the equilibrium posterior, and where the action responds to the state its agreement with that belief exceeds chance by -0.04 to 0.19. The two calls frame the opponent differently, so the result is a behavioural inconsistency and makes no claim about internal beliefs. Under one prompt and greedy decoding, the LM's action never varies with the state in 10 of the 38 cells where the reference varies its own. Memory lowers the constant-action share in 9 of 13 testable ladders at temperature 0; at temperature 0.2 the cells at 1 fall from 16 to 5 of the 46 informative cells, while the belief results hold. A gate withholds, with a stated reason, any belief score the run cannot support, and seven of the eight non-zero defect rates are attributable to the instrument, a representation, or the LMs.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Artificial Intelligence in Games
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