European power and the structure of regulatory upgrading

Abstract In light of the immense difficulty in achieving voluntary intergovernmental cooperation of all states, Nobel laureate William Nordhaus proposed to form a ‘Climate Club’ as a new architecture for international climate cooperation to counter free-riding behaviour of individual participating countries. To some extent, the European Union (EU) Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is an embodiment of such a club, as it is designed to maintain market access for cooperative partners while imposing punitive measures on detractors. In this paper, we investigate how CBAM affects support for climate policies in EU trade partners, balancing Nordhaus’ focus on adaptation costs with a political economy approach that foregrounds political costs and bargaining power. We show that adaptation costs and ‘loyalty’ created by a lack of export alternatives have a strong influence on firm support. Bargaining power, meanwhile, affects the strength of the positions eventually taken by policymakers. When the EU relies upon trade partners for imports, they are more likely to try to leverage their position and gain concessions through negotiations or threats of retaliation. We test our argument by analyzing public debates through an automated text analysis of media in trade partner countries using large language models to identify affected actors and analyze their positions. Our study analyzes all newspaper articles in the Nexis Uni database mentioning CBAM since the European Commission released its official proposal in the ‘fit for 55’ package in July 2021. Our findings align with our expectations for both firm and policymakers, suggesting that success of CBAM and other policies which rely upon a club goods logic will depend on political factors as well as the cost-benefit factors identified by Nordhaus. While abatement costs are an important determinant of stakeholder positions, the political response from EU trade partners ultimately depend upon how costs are distributed, and the capacity of trade partners to bite back.

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Publication Details

Journal
Research Square
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11564453/v1
Primary Topic
Climate Change Policy and Economics
Type
preprint

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preprint

European power and the structure of regulatory upgrading

Dirk De Biévre, Scott Michael Hamilton
2 links
Research Square
Climate Change Policy and Economics
preprint

European power and the structure of regulatory upgrading

Dirk De Biévre, Scott Michael Hamilton
preprint en

Abstract

Abstract In light of the immense difficulty in achieving voluntary intergovernmental cooperation of all states, Nobel laureate William Nordhaus proposed to form a ‘Climate Club’ as a new architecture for international climate cooperation to counter free-riding behaviour of individual participating countries. To some extent, the European Union (EU) Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is an embodiment of such a club, as it is designed to maintain market access for cooperative partners while imposing punitive measures on detractors. In this paper, we investigate how CBAM affects support for climate policies in EU trade partners, balancing Nordhaus’ focus on adaptation costs with a political economy approach that foregrounds political costs and bargaining power. We show that adaptation costs and ‘loyalty’ created by a lack of export alternatives have a strong influence on firm support. Bargaining power, meanwhile, affects the strength of the positions eventually taken by policymakers. When the EU relies upon trade partners for imports, they are more likely to try to leverage their position and gain concessions through negotiations or threats of retaliation. We test our argument by analyzing public debates through an automated text analysis of media in trade partner countries using large language models to identify affected actors and analyze their positions. Our study analyzes all newspaper articles in the Nexis Uni database mentioning CBAM since the European Commission released its official proposal in the ‘fit for 55’ package in July 2021. Our findings align with our expectations for both firm and policymakers, suggesting that success of CBAM and other policies which rely upon a club goods logic will depend on political factors as well as the cost-benefit factors identified by Nordhaus. While abatement costs are an important determinant of stakeholder positions, the political response from EU trade partners ultimately depend upon how costs are distributed, and the capacity of trade partners to bite back.

Research Square
University of Antwerp (BE)
European Commission, Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
Climate action, Partnerships for the goals, Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Climate Change Policy and Economics
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