Why we need Feminist and Decolonial Neuroethicists NOW!

Why We Need Feminist and Decolonial Neuroethicists Now Subtitle: As neurotechnology and artificial intelligence converge to decode and modulate the human brain, the central ethical question is no longer what a scanner can do—but whom that evidence protects, and whom it pathologizes. By Lorena Belem De la Barrera-Soria As I sit in Mexico City working through my reading list for the Oxford Winter Neuroethics School (OWNS), two chapters from The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics keep talking to each other across my desk: Ruth Fischbach and Janet Mindes’s (2011) "Why Neuroethicists are Needed" and Stacey A. Tovino’s (2011) "Women’s Neuroethics". Reading them from Latin America—after years of researching how algorithmic and autonomous systems erode human moral agency, and working alongside colleagues in our regional Feminist AI and human rights networks—I am struck by a realization that has shaped my work in neuroethics: the most dangerous moment for human dignity is not when a technology fails, but when a fragile scientific finding is dressed up as an infallible verdict on who deserves to be believed. In the 1940s and 1950s, American neurologist Walter Freeman performed nearly 3,500 transorbital ("ice-pick") lobotomies—and on one occasion lobotomized 25 women in a single day (McManamy, 2009, as cited in Fischbach & Mindes, 2011, p. 358). Backed by the prestige of the 1949 Nobel Prize awarded to Egas Moniz for prefrontal leukotomy, crude psychosurgery was deployed prior to modern psychopharmacology to reduce agitation and make patients "easier to handle" (Fischbach & Mindes, 2011, p. 358). When I read that passage in Fischbach and Mindes (2011), I do not read it as medical archaeology. I read it as a warning about what Paul Root Wolpe called the near-"fetish" that "progress is its justification" (Carey, 2009, as cited in Fischbach & Mindes, 2011, p. 357), and what Fischbach and Mindes identify as the "technological imperative": "if the technology exists, use it" (p. 345). Against that inertia, neuroethicists are needed at the hospital bedside, on Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), in classrooms, and in courtrooms to uphold the core bioethical maxim: "it is not what you can do; it is what you should do" (Fischbach & Mindes, 2011, p. 345, pp. 366–368). 1. From the Ice-Pick to the "New Phrenology" Today, breaching the sanctuary of the mind no longer requires a surgical leucotome. It only requires overinterpreting a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scan, an electroencephalography (EEG) trace, or an AI-driven neural decoder (Fischbach & Mindes, 2011; Salles & Farisco, 2024). Fischbach and Mindes (2011) trace how the visual authority of neuroimaging can be simplistically interpreted as a "new phrenology" (p. 364)—from commercial companies marketing brain-based lie detection (No Lie MRI, Cephos) and neuromarketing to the looming specter of a "brain search warrant" and workplace screening where an incidental finding like frontal hypoactivation could quietly cost a person their livelihood (pp. 361–365). My quarrel has never been with neuroscience itself; it is with the alchemy by which its most tentative, group-averaged laboratory correlations—which cannot be generalized directly to an individual due to non-ergodicity and reverse-inference limits (Fisher et al., 2018; Poldrack, 2006)—become, in courtrooms and ministries, its most confident instruments of control (Morse, 2006). As Fischbach (2006) argues, we must seek ethical consensus and build public "neuroliteracy" (Illes et al., 2010) while these technologies are taking shape, "not after they have emerged as moral crises or controversies in the public arena" (Fischbach, 2006, p. ix; Fischbach & Mindes, 2011, p. 345, p. 366). 2. The Double-Edged Sword of Women’s Neuroethics What happens when brain science stops treating the human mind as an abstract, unmarked universal—historically normed on white, male, WEIRD cohorts (Chiong, 2020; Eliot et al., 2021; Ricaurte, 2019)—and begins asking about sex and gender? In "Women's Neuroethics", Stacey A. Tovino (2011) examines the ethical, legal, and social stakes of neuroscientific work that takes sex or gender as its primary category of analysis (Chalfin et al., 2008; Tovino, 2011, p. 701). The clinical gains are undeniable. Ignoring sex and gender differences meant overlooking that women and men with chronic depression show statistically significant differences in treatment response and dropout rates between selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) like sertraline and tricyclic antidepressants like imipramine (Kornstein et al., 2000; Tovino, 2011, p. 702). It also meant overlooking structural and functional neuroimaging studies of postpartum depression and psychosis (Lanczik et al., 1998; Silverman et al., 2007), including positron emission tomography (PET) findings showing a 20% to 28% reduction in postsynaptic serotonin-$1\text{A}$ ($5\text{HT}_{1\text{A}}$) receptor binding potential in the anterior cingulate and mesiotemporal cortices of women with postpartum depression (Moses-Kolko et al., 2008; Tovino, 2011, pp. 702–704). Yet Tovino (2011) demonstrates that once these findings enter the legal and social bloodstream, they operate as a double-edged sword: When Neuroscience Protects: In Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Insurance Co. (1990), an insurer capped a mother’s postpartum depression coverage at 30 days of inpatient care and US $1,000 of outpatient treatment because she failed to provide physical neurotransmitter measurements or hormonal tests proving her illness was "physical" rather than "mental" (Tovino, 2011, p. 707). Neurobiological evidence has since become a vital tool for women seeking equal insurance coverage under federal and state mental health parity laws, workplace disability protections under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, and proportional criminal justice in postpartum infanticide legislation (Tovino, 2011, pp. 704–710). When Neuroscience Discredits: The very same research, when filtered through essentialist popular narratives ("Pink Brain, Blue Brain") or uncritical legal habits, risks portraying women as neurologically impaired or hormonally governed—recreating outdated stereotypes that fuel sex-based discrimination across employment, political, and family arenas (Eliot et al., 2021; Tovino, 2011, pp. 711–712). Tovino (2011) closes her chapter with Michelle Oberman’s (2003) foundational question: "How do we try to help some women without pathologizing all women?" (p. 712). 3. How We Live This in Latin America and the Caribbean Where I live and work in Latin America and the Caribbean, Oberman’s (2003) and Tovino’s (2011) question is not a seminar hypothetical. In Mexico City, these patterns are not case studies; they are neighbors. Across our region, we experience both the weaponization of borrowed neuro-psychological authority and the birth of transformative frameworks of resistance: A. The Courtroom as a Site of Epistemic Injustice and Pathologized Dissent. Trauma neuroscience can—and should—protect women in court by explaining why survivors of gender-based violence often exhibit flat affect or nonlinear recall. Yet in practice across Latin America, clinical and neuropsychological grammar is frequently deployed in the opposite direction: not to mitigate criminal punishment (as Denno, 2015, and Farahany, 2016, documented in overwhelmingly male criminal dockets), but to impugn women’s epistemic credibility and maternal fitness. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR, 2011, 2020) and Mexican feminist legal researchers (EQUIS Justicia para las Mujeres, 2019; Intersecta et al., 2025) have documented an exclusionary justice system in which more than 70% of women in Mexico regard access to justice as one of their most violated rights (Intersecta et al., 2025, p. 8). Mexico’s own Supreme Court (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN], 2012, pp. 103–111) has documented how officials record women’s distress in case files under quietly discrediting labels like "nerviosa" ("nervous")—an everyday word doing diagnostic work to dissolve a woman’s testimony. Even more starkly, in July 2025 the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 2025) confirmed that Mexican family courts still fail to apply a gender perspective, allowing mothers who report domestic violence to lose custody of their children through discredited pseudo-clinical constructs such as so-called Parental Alienation Syndrome (excluded from the WHO’s ICD-11 and condemned by UN Special Rapporteur Reem Alsalem, 2023, para. 11; see also Vaccaro & Barea, 2009), while Mexican mothers searching for their disappeared loved ones (madres buscadoras) face institutional disbelief rooted in gendered stereotypes (CEDAW, 2025, para. 27(c), para. 57). As Miranda Fricker (2007) and Havi Carel and Ian James Kidd (2014) show, this is structural testimonial injustice: when a woman’s justified anger at injustice is rewritten as a clinical symptom (Ussher, 2013), the label destroys the evidence. If a discredited pseudo-syndrome can do such damage on borrowed scientific costume alone, imagine what uncalibrated neuro-forensics will do when they arrive in the same family courts. B. From "Digital Farming" and Hormonal Myths to Care as a Human Right. A second way we live this in Latin America is through the struggle over who owns our data and who bears the cost of care. On one side, popular neuro-narratives have long tried to reduce caregiving to female neurochemistry (such as simplified "moral molecule" myths around oxytocin that neuroscientists themselves challenged; Churchland & Winkielman, 2012), turning the ethical labor of care into a hormonal reflex. When care is naturalized as female instinct, states retreat: as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2022) documented during the pandemic, the withdrawal of public services across our region wa

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Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
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2026-11-17
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https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24322867
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Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
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article

Why we need Feminist and Decolonial Neuroethicists NOW!

Lorena Belem De la Barrera Soria
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
article

Why we need Feminist and Decolonial Neuroethicists NOW!

Lorena Belem De la Barrera Soria
article en

Abstract

Why We Need Feminist and Decolonial Neuroethicists Now Subtitle: As neurotechnology and artificial intelligence converge to decode and modulate the human brain, the central ethical question is no longer what a scanner can do—but whom that evidence protects, and whom it pathologizes. By Lorena Belem De la Barrera-Soria As I sit in Mexico City working through my reading list for the Oxford Winter Neuroethics School (OWNS), two chapters from The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics keep talking to each other across my desk: Ruth Fischbach and Janet Mindes’s (2011) "Why Neuroethicists are Needed" and Stacey A. Tovino’s (2011) "Women’s Neuroethics". Reading them from Latin America—after years of researching how algorithmic and autonomous systems erode human moral agency, and working alongside colleagues in our regional Feminist AI and human rights networks—I am struck by a realization that has shaped my work in neuroethics: the most dangerous moment for human dignity is not when a technology fails, but when a fragile scientific finding is dressed up as an infallible verdict on who deserves to be believed. In the 1940s and 1950s, American neurologist Walter Freeman performed nearly 3,500 transorbital ("ice-pick") lobotomies—and on one occasion lobotomized 25 women in a single day (McManamy, 2009, as cited in Fischbach & Mindes, 2011, p. 358). Backed by the prestige of the 1949 Nobel Prize awarded to Egas Moniz for prefrontal leukotomy, crude psychosurgery was deployed prior to modern psychopharmacology to reduce agitation and make patients "easier to handle" (Fischbach & Mindes, 2011, p. 358). When I read that passage in Fischbach and Mindes (2011), I do not read it as medical archaeology. I read it as a warning about what Paul Root Wolpe called the near-"fetish" that "progress is its justification" (Carey, 2009, as cited in Fischbach & Mindes, 2011, p. 357), and what Fischbach and Mindes identify as the "technological imperative": "if the technology exists, use it" (p. 345). Against that inertia, neuroethicists are needed at the hospital bedside, on Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), in classrooms, and in courtrooms to uphold the core bioethical maxim: "it is not what you can do; it is what you should do" (Fischbach & Mindes, 2011, p. 345, pp. 366–368). 1. From the Ice-Pick to the "New Phrenology" Today, breaching the sanctuary of the mind no longer requires a surgical leucotome. It only requires overinterpreting a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scan, an electroencephalography (EEG) trace, or an AI-driven neural decoder (Fischbach & Mindes, 2011; Salles & Farisco, 2024). Fischbach and Mindes (2011) trace how the visual authority of neuroimaging can be simplistically interpreted as a "new phrenology" (p. 364)—from commercial companies marketing brain-based lie detection (No Lie MRI, Cephos) and neuromarketing to the looming specter of a "brain search warrant" and workplace screening where an incidental finding like frontal hypoactivation could quietly cost a person their livelihood (pp. 361–365). My quarrel has never been with neuroscience itself; it is with the alchemy by which its most tentative, group-averaged laboratory correlations—which cannot be generalized directly to an individual due to non-ergodicity and reverse-inference limits (Fisher et al., 2018; Poldrack, 2006)—become, in courtrooms and ministries, its most confident instruments of control (Morse, 2006). As Fischbach (2006) argues, we must seek ethical consensus and build public "neuroliteracy" (Illes et al., 2010) while these technologies are taking shape, "not after they have emerged as moral crises or controversies in the public arena" (Fischbach, 2006, p. ix; Fischbach & Mindes, 2011, p. 345, p. 366). 2. The Double-Edged Sword of Women’s Neuroethics What happens when brain science stops treating the human mind as an abstract, unmarked universal—historically normed on white, male, WEIRD cohorts (Chiong, 2020; Eliot et al., 2021; Ricaurte, 2019)—and begins asking about sex and gender? In "Women's Neuroethics", Stacey A. Tovino (2011) examines the ethical, legal, and social stakes of neuroscientific work that takes sex or gender as its primary category of analysis (Chalfin et al., 2008; Tovino, 2011, p. 701). The clinical gains are undeniable. Ignoring sex and gender differences meant overlooking that women and men with chronic depression show statistically significant differences in treatment response and dropout rates between selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) like sertraline and tricyclic antidepressants like imipramine (Kornstein et al., 2000; Tovino, 2011, p. 702). It also meant overlooking structural and functional neuroimaging studies of postpartum depression and psychosis (Lanczik et al., 1998; Silverman et al., 2007), including positron emission tomography (PET) findings showing a 20% to 28% reduction in postsynaptic serotonin-$1\text{A}$ ($5\text{HT}_{1\text{A}}$) receptor binding potential in the anterior cingulate and mesiotemporal cortices of women with postpartum depression (Moses-Kolko et al., 2008; Tovino, 2011, pp. 702–704). Yet Tovino (2011) demonstrates that once these findings enter the legal and social bloodstream, they operate as a double-edged sword: When Neuroscience Protects: In Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Insurance Co. (1990), an insurer capped a mother’s postpartum depression coverage at 30 days of inpatient care and US $1,000 of outpatient treatment because she failed to provide physical neurotransmitter measurements or hormonal tests proving her illness was "physical" rather than "mental" (Tovino, 2011, p. 707). Neurobiological evidence has since become a vital tool for women seeking equal insurance coverage under federal and state mental health parity laws, workplace disability protections under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, and proportional criminal justice in postpartum infanticide legislation (Tovino, 2011, pp. 704–710). When Neuroscience Discredits: The very same research, when filtered through essentialist popular narratives ("Pink Brain, Blue Brain") or uncritical legal habits, risks portraying women as neurologically impaired or hormonally governed—recreating outdated stereotypes that fuel sex-based discrimination across employment, political, and family arenas (Eliot et al., 2021; Tovino, 2011, pp. 711–712). Tovino (2011) closes her chapter with Michelle Oberman’s (2003) foundational question: "How do we try to help some women without pathologizing all women?" (p. 712). 3. How We Live This in Latin America and the Caribbean Where I live and work in Latin America and the Caribbean, Oberman’s (2003) and Tovino’s (2011) question is not a seminar hypothetical. In Mexico City, these patterns are not case studies; they are neighbors. Across our region, we experience both the weaponization of borrowed neuro-psychological authority and the birth of transformative frameworks of resistance: A. The Courtroom as a Site of Epistemic Injustice and Pathologized Dissent. Trauma neuroscience can—and should—protect women in court by explaining why survivors of gender-based violence often exhibit flat affect or nonlinear recall. Yet in practice across Latin America, clinical and neuropsychological grammar is frequently deployed in the opposite direction: not to mitigate criminal punishment (as Denno, 2015, and Farahany, 2016, documented in overwhelmingly male criminal dockets), but to impugn women’s epistemic credibility and maternal fitness. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR, 2011, 2020) and Mexican feminist legal researchers (EQUIS Justicia para las Mujeres, 2019; Intersecta et al., 2025) have documented an exclusionary justice system in which more than 70% of women in Mexico regard access to justice as one of their most violated rights (Intersecta et al., 2025, p. 8). Mexico’s own Supreme Court (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN], 2012, pp. 103–111) has documented how officials record women’s distress in case files under quietly discrediting labels like "nerviosa" ("nervous")—an everyday word doing diagnostic work to dissolve a woman’s testimony. Even more starkly, in July 2025 the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 2025) confirmed that Mexican family courts still fail to apply a gender perspective, allowing mothers who report domestic violence to lose custody of their children through discredited pseudo-clinical constructs such as so-called Parental Alienation Syndrome (excluded from the WHO’s ICD-11 and condemned by UN Special Rapporteur Reem Alsalem, 2023, para. 11; see also Vaccaro & Barea, 2009), while Mexican mothers searching for their disappeared loved ones (madres buscadoras) face institutional disbelief rooted in gendered stereotypes (CEDAW, 2025, para. 27(c), para. 57). As Miranda Fricker (2007) and Havi Carel and Ian James Kidd (2014) show, this is structural testimonial injustice: when a woman’s justified anger at injustice is rewritten as a clinical symptom (Ussher, 2013), the label destroys the evidence. If a discredited pseudo-syndrome can do such damage on borrowed scientific costume alone, imagine what uncalibrated neuro-forensics will do when they arrive in the same family courts. B. From "Digital Farming" and Hormonal Myths to Care as a Human Right. A second way we live this in Latin America is through the struggle over who owns our data and who bears the cost of care. On one side, popular neuro-narratives have long tried to reduce caregiving to female neurochemistry (such as simplified "moral molecule" myths around oxytocin that neuroscientists themselves challenged; Churchland & Winkielman, 2012), turning the ethical labor of care into a hormonal reflex. When care is naturalized as female instinct, states retreat: as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2022) documented during the pandemic, the withdrawal of public services across our region wa

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Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
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