Artifact provenance and verifiable recovery in defence networks

Abstract Objective: How can a dependency alert be linked to containment decisions and integrity preserving service recovery? Method: purposive documentary synthesis and dependency analysis from a military intelligence perspective, comparing public technical and institutional references. Evidence, inference and exercise assumptions are distinguished. Results: the study proposes a justification chain, defensive architecture and response flowchart, together with observables for future evaluation. A deployed artifact should remain linked to code, build process, configuration and promotion authority. The contribution links observed capability, competent authority and risk acceptance. No experimental measurements were obtained and operational effectiveness was not estimated. Interoperability references and NIST frameworks are applied within their scope and do not constitute certification. Conclusion: Reliable recovery depends on a provenance chain established before an incident. Intelligence prioritisation should translate into verifiable scope decisions and acceptance of the restored service. The model requires external review and authorised testing before adoption.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24305456
Primary Topic
Information and Cyber Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Artifact provenance and verifiable recovery in defence networks

ANDRES SALAVERRIA GALVAN
5 links
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Information and Cyber Security
article

Artifact provenance and verifiable recovery in defence networks

ANDRES SALAVERRIA GALVAN
article en

Abstract

Abstract Objective: How can a dependency alert be linked to containment decisions and integrity preserving service recovery? Method: purposive documentary synthesis and dependency analysis from a military intelligence perspective, comparing public technical and institutional references. Evidence, inference and exercise assumptions are distinguished. Results: the study proposes a justification chain, defensive architecture and response flowchart, together with observables for future evaluation. A deployed artifact should remain linked to code, build process, configuration and promotion authority. The contribution links observed capability, competent authority and risk acceptance. No experimental measurements were obtained and operational effectiveness was not estimated. Interoperability references and NIST frameworks are applied within their scope and do not constitute certification. Conclusion: Reliable recovery depends on a provenance chain established before an incident. Intelligence prioritisation should translate into verifiable scope decisions and acceptance of the restored service. The model requires external review and authorised testing before adoption.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Information and Cyber Security
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