CEO-board social-tie density, compatibility and investment policies

Purpose This study aims to examine how CEO–board social-tie density and compatibility influence investment efficiency and M&A announcement performance, with board co-option and disclosure readability as moderating factors. It asks whether relational proximity improves decision quality or weakens governance, and whether these effects are nonlinear. Design/methodology/approach Using a panel of 612 nonfinancial firms from the S&P 1,500 and STOXX Europe 600 during 2010–2024, the study constructs CEO–board ties from shared employment, education and associations. Investment efficiency is estimated from standard investment models, and M&A performance is measured by short-window acquirer cumulative abnormal returns . Hierarchical regressions with fixed effects are complemented by robustness and 2SLS tests. Findings CEO–board social-tie density exhibits a concave association with both investment efficiency and M&A announcement returns, consistent with the predicted inverted U-shaped pattern. Moderate tie density improves coordination and information exchange, whereas excessive density weakens independent challenge. Compatibility strengthens the beneficial association between tie density and investment efficiency and shifts its turning point toward higher levels, whereas co-option shifts the turning point toward lower levels. In M&A settings, greater disclosure readability strengthens the favorable association between tie density and announcement returns. Originality/value This study contributes by showing how CEO–board relational structures shape firm-level investment and acquisition outcomes through a nonlinear agency-advisory mechanism. Rather than treating CEO–board ties as uniformly harmful or beneficial, it demonstrates that their consequences depend on where firms lie on the relational-density spectrum and on how compatibility and co-option condition that position. It advances a contingent view of relational governance by linking boardroom social structure to both internal capital-allocation efficiency and market-based acquisition outcomes.

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Publication Details

Journal
Management Research Review
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1108/mrr-11-2025-0969
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

CEO-board social-tie density, compatibility and investment policies

Hamzeh Adel Al Amosh
Management Research Review
Corporate Finance and Governance
article

CEO-board social-tie density, compatibility and investment policies

Hamzeh Adel Al Amosh
article en

Abstract

Purpose This study aims to examine how CEO–board social-tie density and compatibility influence investment efficiency and M&A announcement performance, with board co-option and disclosure readability as moderating factors. It asks whether relational proximity improves decision quality or weakens governance, and whether these effects are nonlinear. Design/methodology/approach Using a panel of 612 nonfinancial firms from the S&P 1,500 and STOXX Europe 600 during 2010–2024, the study constructs CEO–board ties from shared employment, education and associations. Investment efficiency is estimated from standard investment models, and M&A performance is measured by short-window acquirer cumulative abnormal returns . Hierarchical regressions with fixed effects are complemented by robustness and 2SLS tests. Findings CEO–board social-tie density exhibits a concave association with both investment efficiency and M&A announcement returns, consistent with the predicted inverted U-shaped pattern. Moderate tie density improves coordination and information exchange, whereas excessive density weakens independent challenge. Compatibility strengthens the beneficial association between tie density and investment efficiency and shifts its turning point toward higher levels, whereas co-option shifts the turning point toward lower levels. In M&A settings, greater disclosure readability strengthens the favorable association between tie density and announcement returns. Originality/value This study contributes by showing how CEO–board relational structures shape firm-level investment and acquisition outcomes through a nonlinear agency-advisory mechanism. Rather than treating CEO–board ties as uniformly harmful or beneficial, it demonstrates that their consequences depend on where firms lie on the relational-density spectrum and on how compatibility and co-option condition that position. It advances a contingent view of relational governance by linking boardroom social structure to both internal capital-allocation efficiency and market-based acquisition outcomes.

Management Research Review
University of South Africa (ZA), Jadara University (JO)
Corporate Finance and Governance
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