Wydanie rozporządzenia w porozumieniu ze związkami wyznaniowymi. Glosa do wyroku TK z 3 lipca 2025 r., U 2/25

This article offers a critical commentary on the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 July 2025, U 2/25, which declared unconstitutional the Regulation of the Minister of Education of 17 January 2025 amending the rules on the organisation of religious instruction in public kindergartens and schools. The Tribunal held that it had been issued in breach of the Education System Act, which requires that such a regulation be adopted “in agreement with” religious organisations. On the Tribunal’s reasoning, the absence of any such agreement was fatal to the regulation as a whole. The author challenges the judgment on four principal grounds. First, bodies that are not public authorities may not be drawn into the procedure for issuing regulations. This is not merely a matter of sound legislative technique but follows from the constitutional conception of a closed system of sources of law: to treat the position of religious organisations as binding would place them on an equal footing with the authority issuing the regulation, thereby blurring the line between taking part in its adoption and jointly enacting the law. Second, the Tribunal effectively departed from the view it had taken in 1993 on the meaning of the phrase “in agreement with”, yet perversely presented this as evidence of continuity in its case law, even though the earlier ruling had been handed down by a full bench. Third, it is mistaken to argue that keeping the “in agreement with” requirement in the legal system reflects a legislative intention to privilege religious organisations, given that the Tribunal itself once read the provision as imposing no more than a duty to gather and consider their expectations, rather than to secure their consent. Fourth, the author regards as baseless – and as damaging to the culture of constitutional argument – the claim that the prolonged operation of a potentially unconstitutional legal mechanism might, of itself, cure its defects.

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Journal
Przegląd Konstytucyjny
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.4467/25442031pko.26.025.24102
Primary Topic
Polish Law and Legal System
Type
article
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article

Wydanie rozporządzenia w porozumieniu ze związkami wyznaniowymi. Glosa do wyroku TK z 3 lipca 2025 r., U 2/25

Wojciech Brzozowski
1 links
Przegląd Konstytucyjny
Polish Law and Legal System
article

Wydanie rozporządzenia w porozumieniu ze związkami wyznaniowymi. Glosa do wyroku TK z 3 lipca 2025 r., U 2/25

Wojciech Brzozowski
article en

Abstract

This article offers a critical commentary on the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 July 2025, U 2/25, which declared unconstitutional the Regulation of the Minister of Education of 17 January 2025 amending the rules on the organisation of religious instruction in public kindergartens and schools. The Tribunal held that it had been issued in breach of the Education System Act, which requires that such a regulation be adopted “in agreement with” religious organisations. On the Tribunal’s reasoning, the absence of any such agreement was fatal to the regulation as a whole. The author challenges the judgment on four principal grounds. First, bodies that are not public authorities may not be drawn into the procedure for issuing regulations. This is not merely a matter of sound legislative technique but follows from the constitutional conception of a closed system of sources of law: to treat the position of religious organisations as binding would place them on an equal footing with the authority issuing the regulation, thereby blurring the line between taking part in its adoption and jointly enacting the law. Second, the Tribunal effectively departed from the view it had taken in 1993 on the meaning of the phrase “in agreement with”, yet perversely presented this as evidence of continuity in its case law, even though the earlier ruling had been handed down by a full bench. Third, it is mistaken to argue that keeping the “in agreement with” requirement in the legal system reflects a legislative intention to privilege religious organisations, given that the Tribunal itself once read the provision as imposing no more than a duty to gather and consider their expectations, rather than to secure their consent. Fourth, the author regards as baseless – and as damaging to the culture of constitutional argument – the claim that the prolonged operation of a potentially unconstitutional legal mechanism might, of itself, cure its defects.

Przegląd Konstytucyjny(3)
University of Warsaw (PL)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Polish Law and Legal System
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