Nobody Automates Their Own Job for Free

The capability to automate a task and the decision to automate it are separated by a disclosure. The person who can describe a task well enough to automate it is usually the person whose role shrinks when it is automated, so the description is a bargaining move rather than a technical report. Firms therefore observe outcomes and not opportunities, and they cannot distinguish a task that is genuinely hard to automate from a task that is easy to automate and strategically described as hard. This paper sets out the mechanism, derives the condition under which silence is rational, and examines the three counter-moves available to a firm: paying for discovery, buying it from outside, and reorganizing so that the discovery and the loss fall on different people. The private information problem at the center of the argument is old, and the contribution claimed here is its application to the discovery stage of automation together with the observable implications that follow. The thesis is that compensation design, not model capability, governs how fast a firm finds its own work.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24276796
Primary Topic
Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Nobody Automates Their Own Job for Free

Rose Zee, Samson Williams
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
article

Nobody Automates Their Own Job for Free

Rose Zee, Samson Williams
article en

Abstract

The capability to automate a task and the decision to automate it are separated by a disclosure. The person who can describe a task well enough to automate it is usually the person whose role shrinks when it is automated, so the description is a bargaining move rather than a technical report. Firms therefore observe outcomes and not opportunities, and they cannot distinguish a task that is genuinely hard to automate from a task that is easy to automate and strategically described as hard. This paper sets out the mechanism, derives the condition under which silence is rational, and examines the three counter-moves available to a firm: paying for discovery, buying it from outside, and reorganizing so that the discovery and the loss fall on different people. The private information problem at the center of the argument is old, and the contribution claimed here is its application to the discovery stage of automation together with the observable implications that follow. The thesis is that compensation design, not model capability, governs how fast a firm finds its own work.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Decent work and economic growth
Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
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