Sensation and Perception in Merleau‐Ponty

Abstract The long “Introduction” to the Phenomenology of Perception begins with a rejection of the classical notion of sensation as “the most confused notion there is.” And yet Merleau‐Ponty continues to speak of sensation throughout the Phenomenology , and indeed, throughout his corpus. This poses an obvious interpretive puzzle, and one which has not received a focal treatment in the literature. In this paper, I consider three questions: 1) What view of sensing does Merleau‐Ponty reject in the Introduction? 2) On the other hand, what view of sensation does he wish to maintain? 3) How exactly does sensation, on his view, differ from perception? By working through these questions, I propose an interpretation on which sensation is conceived as a kind of perception, and one which is expressively basic (in a sense to be explained), such that in being given, it discloses other phenomena that are not properly given.

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Publication Details

Journal
European Journal of Philosophy
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70132
Primary Topic
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Sensation and Perception in Merleau‐Ponty

Peter Antich
European Journal of Philosophy
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
article

Sensation and Perception in Merleau‐Ponty

Peter Antich
article en

Abstract

Abstract The long “Introduction” to the Phenomenology of Perception begins with a rejection of the classical notion of sensation as “the most confused notion there is.” And yet Merleau‐Ponty continues to speak of sensation throughout the Phenomenology , and indeed, throughout his corpus. This poses an obvious interpretive puzzle, and one which has not received a focal treatment in the literature. In this paper, I consider three questions: 1) What view of sensing does Merleau‐Ponty reject in the Introduction? 2) On the other hand, what view of sensation does he wish to maintain? 3) How exactly does sensation, on his view, differ from perception? By working through these questions, I propose an interpretation on which sensation is conceived as a kind of perception, and one which is expressively basic (in a sense to be explained), such that in being given, it discloses other phenomena that are not properly given.

European Journal of Philosophy
Dominican College of Blauvelt (US)
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
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