CoronaPoker: A Verifiable Protocol for Peer-to-Peer Poker
In peer-to-peer poker, the host may also be a player at the table. If that host prepares a plaintext deck, it can inspect the cards dealt to opponents and the community cards still to come. CoronaPoker blocks this distributing deck construction and opening among the participants. They apply secret permutations and commutative scalar locks over Ristretto255, then replace the locks on community positions with independent keys. The host coordinates the exchanges, while participants verify construction evidence and authorize partial openings against their own stored deck and the stage of play. This paper specifies those operations and examines the guarantees of the implemented proof composition. We establish conditional card reconstruction and a soundness bound for the community rotation in an ideal random-oracle model. For the shuffle, we derive aggregate bounds and identify the additional representation and extraction arguments needed to obtain a complete soundness result. We also show how a public aggregate distinguishes two candidate permutations, and explain the consequence for zero knowledge when the input points are fixed independently of the simulator. These results clarify both the evidence available during a hand and the limits of the present analysis. Full shuffle soundness and privacy of the complete poker execution remain open.
Authors
- Antonio Lopez Vivar (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5125-1713)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-16
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24279298
- Primary Topic
- Cryptography and Data Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00