High threat, no category: Chinese underground banking, Fei Qian and the categorical gap in the Baltic AML regime
The three Baltic states present a distinctive configuration in the European landscape of Chinese informal value transfer systems (Fei Qian / Dixia Qianzhuang). Each has a mature anti-money-laundering framework, a Financial Intelligence Unit integrated into the Egmont Group, and a MONEYVAL mutual evaluation history. Each recognises underground banking or informal value transfer as a money-laundering risk. Estonia's 2025 national risk assessment identifies company service providers, payment and e-money institutions, and companies with weak ties to Estonia as higher-risk sectors, and notes that criminal proceeds obtained abroad are layered through the Estonian financial system using fictitious invoices, loan agreements and money-laundering service provision. Latvia's sixth-round MONEYVAL evaluation found high or substantial effectiveness in ten of eleven Immediate Outcomes. Lithuania revoked the licence of Chinese-owned e-money institution Paytend Europe in March 2026 for serious and systematic AML failures. Yet none of the three has produced a publicly documented Fei Qian-specific investigation, court judgment or operational typology. Drawing on national risk assessments, MONEYVAL evaluations, supervisory decisions and enforcement records, this article argues that the Baltic position is not ignorance but categorical blindness: the intelligence cycle closes at the generic category of underground banking or IVTS. A comparison with the United States—where ICE defines the Chinese Underground Banking System as feiqian and provides a taxonomy of actors, settlement methods and transaction indicators, and where FinCEN has issued a category-specific advisory covering 137,153 suspicious-activity reports and approximately USD 312 billion in flagged transactions—establishes the global benchmark of dedicated recognition. Yet US enforcement remains coded as generic: prosecutions proceed under money-transmitting and money-laundering statutes, and the dedicated operations that would complete the R3/E3 configuration are absent. The article concludes that the R3/E3 cell is empty not only in Europe but globally, and draws implications for differentiated Baltic threat assessment.
Authors
- Alexander Jungmann
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-16
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24287910
- Primary Topic
- Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
- Type
- preprint