Three Hard Problems, One Presupposition
Three classic problems — the ontology of time, Leibniz's question why there is something rather than nothing, and free will — are usually treated as three separate mysteries. This paper argues that they share a single manufactured form: each demands a world-side address for a quantity that belongs to the side of the cut — a location for the "now", a possible state called "nothing", an uncaused origin for choice — and, in the cases of time and free will, each smuggles in the very bearer it pretends not to presuppose. The paper sets out a compact set of declared premises — feeling and response are given, not produced by individuals; what is borne in reception is counted per bearer; possibility is treated as inventory; verdicts require a declared cut of grain, scale, and time window — and shows that, under these premises, the three problems do not get solved but come undone: time divides into world time, public time, and individual time; "nothing" is re-sited as the condition of possibility under no determination, the ground beneath the world rather than one of its states; and freedom is located where alone it can be — where there is no individual. The dissolutions are conditional on the declared premises, and their costs are stated section by section.
Authors
- Kimiyasu Igarashi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-5947-3261)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-17
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24292060
- Primary Topic
- Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Type
- preprint