Tax Competition When the Quality of Public Services Matter: An Analysis in a Rural Context
Suppose that workers only receive a direct benefit from local public services when they are of sufficient quality, and below that level taxes are viewed as wasteful. Local governments have the choice of supplying high-quality public services, which imposes a relatively high tax burden on residents, or offering minimal services and a low tax rate, allowing residents to enjoy more private consumption. This paper asks two questions: If local governments compete over tax rates to try and maximize social welfare then, (1) under what conditions is a high-tax, high-public service level policy viable, and (2) when is this policy superior to a low-tax policy. We use our results to motivate a discussion on public service provision in rural communities, focusing on the determinants of the local tax base and the set of public services demanded given the current demographic conditions in rural areas.
Authors
- Juan Carlos Lopez (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3917-1996)
- MORITA Tadashi
Institutions
- University of Denver (US)
- Kindai University (JP)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Review of Regional Studies
- Published
- 2026-11-16
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.52324/001c.175420
- Primary Topic
- Local Government Finance and Decentralization
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science