After Deterrence? Coercive Saturation, Survival Narratives, and Bargaining Leverage in the 2026 Iran–Israel–United States Conflict
This article develops deterrence exhaustion to explain how repeated coercion produces diminishing political returns despite military superiority. Applying coercive diplomacy and theory-guided process tracing to the 2026 Iran–Israel–United States conflict, it examines how Iranian regime survival and retained disruptive capacity generated limited leverage during the June ceasefire process. The mechanism connects coercive saturation, declining threat credibility, reciprocal vulnerability, survival narratives, and political bargaining effects. Findings indicate tactical coercive success alongside failed political imposition, creating a temporary opening for negotiated restraint. Non-submission can therefore become politically consequential without constituting strategic victory, consolidated regional transformation, or evidence of a stable post-hegemonic West Asia.
Authors
- AKM Ahsan Ullah (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1441-141X)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Strategic Analysis
- Published
- 2026-11-16
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2026.2760100
- Primary Topic
- International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00