SHADOW ORDER AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SERBIA: BETWEEN FORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMAL RULES
This paper analyses the relationship between the shadow order, informal rules, and democratic consolidation in Serbia. It argues that formal institutional reforms do not necessarily lead to consolidation when institutions remain shaped by clientelism, patronage, corruption, and selective rule enforcement. The paper combines a theoretical-analytical approach with a descriptive empirical case study based on V-Dem v16 data for Serbia, 1990–2025, and comparison with Western Balkan peers. The analysis shows that after 2012 the rule of law and judicial and legislative constraints weakened, while clientelism, political corruption, public-sector corruption, and the decline of societal accountability indicated the strengthening of informal mechanisms. The central finding is that the shadow order persists because it offers actors a rational strategy for securing resources, protection, and influence under unreliable formal rules, while collectively producing institutional inefficiency, inequality, and weakened rule of law. The paper concludes that democratic consolidation requires not only formal reforms but also a change in the incentive structure sustaining informal mechanisms.
Authors
- Marija Džunić (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5269-1921)
- Nataša Golubović (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6789-5158)
Institutions
- University of Nis (RS)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Facta Universitatis Series Economics and Organization
- Published
- 2026-11-16
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.22190/fueo260810011g
- Primary Topic
- Corruption and Economic Development
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00