Commercial Embeddedness and Sanctions Busting: Intra-Industry Trade, Dependence, and Economic Asymmetry

Why do some third-party states expand trade with sanctioned targets while others do not? I develop a typology of commercial logics to distinguish dependence from commercial embeddedness. Using directed dyad-year data on third-party trade with sanctioned targets from 1963–2023, I show that third-party trade share and intra-industry trade are both associated with sanctions busting, but these relationships vary with the economic size difference between the third party and target. Among economically similar states, sanctions busting is concentrated where trade is both commercially important and intra-industry in nature, consistent with embedded interdependence. Among highly asymmetric states, sanctions busting is concentrated at comparatively lower levels of third-party trade share when intra-industry trade is present, suggesting uneven commercial opportunities that commercial dependence cannot capture. Sanctions busting is best understood as emerging from distinct configurations of commercial exposure and embeddedness that vary with the economic size difference between third parties and targets.

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Publication Details

Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2026-7wxvk
Primary Topic
Economic Sanctions and International Relations
Type
preprint
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Commercial Embeddedness and Sanctions Busting: Intra-Industry Trade, Dependence, and Economic Asymmetry

Keith Preble
Economic Sanctions and International Relations
preprint

Commercial Embeddedness and Sanctions Busting: Intra-Industry Trade, Dependence, and Economic Asymmetry

Keith Preble
preprint en

Abstract

Why do some third-party states expand trade with sanctioned targets while others do not? I develop a typology of commercial logics to distinguish dependence from commercial embeddedness. Using directed dyad-year data on third-party trade with sanctioned targets from 1963–2023, I show that third-party trade share and intra-industry trade are both associated with sanctions busting, but these relationships vary with the economic size difference between the third party and target. Among economically similar states, sanctions busting is concentrated where trade is both commercially important and intra-industry in nature, consistent with embedded interdependence. Among highly asymmetric states, sanctions busting is concentrated at comparatively lower levels of third-party trade share when intra-industry trade is present, suggesting uneven commercial opportunities that commercial dependence cannot capture. Sanctions busting is best understood as emerging from distinct configurations of commercial exposure and embeddedness that vary with the economic size difference between third parties and targets.

East Carolina University (US)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Economic Sanctions and International Relations
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