When the World Resists the Model: Can Physical Failure Reveal a Missing Mathematical Structure?
Physical AI systems increasingly rely on predictive world models to anticipate the consequences of acting in real environments. When physical observations contradict model predictions, the resulting discrepancy may motivate causal investigation, model revision, or mathematical reconstruction. Yet the evidence required to reject a physical model differs from the evidence required to establish that a mathematical representation class cannot recover the observed phenomenon. This paper investigates the epistemic boundary between these judgments in AI-assisted scientific discovery. Drawing on model-based diagnosis, Bayesian model discrepancy, causal consistency, computational model validation, and mathematical-recognition research, it develops a bounded conceptual account of bidirectional warrant separation. Physical evidence cannot independently establish mathematical insufficiency; conversely, a valid mathematical obstruction cannot establish its relevance to a physical phenomenon without appropriate empirical and representational justification. Adversarial thought experiments distinguish recoverable model failures, abstract class-relative exclusions, jointly warranted bounded limitations, and unresolved investigations. The analysis further explains why even a demonstrated class-relative obstruction does not establish foundational mathematical novelty. Its proposed contribution is a domain-specific conceptual synthesis that makes the inferential boundary between physical failure and mathematical claims explicit. No new mathematical theorem, empirical validation, or demonstrated superiority over conventional scientific methodologies is claimed.
Authors
- Rogério Figurelli (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-5726-1765)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-15
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24250468
- Primary Topic
- Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Type
- preprint