The Sign of Directional Flow Asymmetry Depends on the Benign Reference and the Measurement Pipeline: Preregistered Tests and Robustness Audits in Network Intrusion Detection

The imbalance between the bytes a flow sends and receives is a common intrusion-detection signal, and using it assumes that the direction of the imbalance is a property of the attack, so that it can be learned on one benchmark and carried to another. We test that assumption with preregistered external tests and post-hoc robustness audits, labeling every result by its evidential status. Graph topology did not outlast per-flow asymmetry under information restriction (H2, rejected). The CICIDS-2018 observation that the sign of per-flow asymmetry varied by attack did not replicate on UNSW-NB15 and met the frozen criterion on BoT-IoT (STRONG REPLICATION). The BoT-IoT verdict does not support the reading it invited: resampling host pairs instead of flows widened intervals from 0.014-0.018 to 0.27-0.41, only 3 of 8 evaluable groups kept a confident orientation, and restricting to answered flows made all ten point estimates positive. On CICIDS-2018, HOIC and Hulk reverse when the same traffic is re-exported as NetFlow-v2 with its own benign reference. UNSW-NB15 is the counterexample: its orientation was largely stable. A sign change did not consistently reduce separability. Signed directional orientation is a relational measurement, not an intrinsic attack attribute; a fixed-sign directional feature should be validated against the target pipeline and a named benign reference before its sign is assumed to transport. The evidence is limited to three benchmark datasets and does not include production traffic. Preprint, not peer reviewed. The first file is the paper; the second is its supplementary material (full methods, tables and sensitivity analyses). Code, pre-registration freezes, confirmatory outputs and audits: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24238405

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Publication Details

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Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-15
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24239091
Primary Topic
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Type
preprint
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preprint

The Sign of Directional Flow Asymmetry Depends on the Benign Reference and the Measurement Pipeline: Preregistered Tests and Robustness Audits in Network Intrusion Detection

David Alexis García-Espinosa, Jose Ignacio Naranjo-Guerra, Misael López S., J. Emilio Malagón Martínez
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
preprint

The Sign of Directional Flow Asymmetry Depends on the Benign Reference and the Measurement Pipeline: Preregistered Tests and Robustness Audits in Network Intrusion Detection

David Alexis García-Espinosa, Jose Ignacio Naranjo-Guerra, Misael López S., J. Emilio Malagón Martínez
preprint en

Abstract

The imbalance between the bytes a flow sends and receives is a common intrusion-detection signal, and using it assumes that the direction of the imbalance is a property of the attack, so that it can be learned on one benchmark and carried to another. We test that assumption with preregistered external tests and post-hoc robustness audits, labeling every result by its evidential status. Graph topology did not outlast per-flow asymmetry under information restriction (H2, rejected). The CICIDS-2018 observation that the sign of per-flow asymmetry varied by attack did not replicate on UNSW-NB15 and met the frozen criterion on BoT-IoT (STRONG REPLICATION). The BoT-IoT verdict does not support the reading it invited: resampling host pairs instead of flows widened intervals from 0.014-0.018 to 0.27-0.41, only 3 of 8 evaluable groups kept a confident orientation, and restricting to answered flows made all ten point estimates positive. On CICIDS-2018, HOIC and Hulk reverse when the same traffic is re-exported as NetFlow-v2 with its own benign reference. UNSW-NB15 is the counterexample: its orientation was largely stable. A sign change did not consistently reduce separability. Signed directional orientation is a relational measurement, not an intrinsic attack attribute; a fixed-sign directional feature should be validated against the target pipeline and a named benign reference before its sign is assumed to transport. The evidence is limited to three benchmark datasets and does not include production traffic. Preprint, not peer reviewed. The first file is the paper; the second is its supplementary material (full methods, tables and sensitivity analyses). Code, pre-registration freezes, confirmatory outputs and audits: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24238405

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (MX), Tecnológico de Monterrey (MX)
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
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