Environmental Regulation: A Novel “Booster” of Competition Policy?
ABSTRACT We investigate how emission fees affect the effectiveness of competition policy (audits, leniency, and whistleblower programs) at deterring collusion. When competition policy is absent, emission fees hinder collusion if profit losses from deviation are more affected by the fee than profit gains. When competition policy is present, we show that fees amplify the effectiveness of audits, leniency, and whistleblower programs at deterring collusive practices. Our results suggest that leniency and whistleblower programs can reduce rewards in polluting industries without diminishing their impact. Our findings are robust to production costs being convex, differentiated products, industries with more than two firms, and firms competing in prices.
Authors
- Ana Espínola‐Arredondo (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5983-9527)
- Félix Muñoz-garcía Y (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6727-3618)
Institutions
- Universitat de València (ES)
- Washington State University (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Published
- 2026-11-15
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70156
- Primary Topic
- Merger and Competition Analysis
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00