Optimal Power Scheduling on Cyber‐Physical Systems Subject to DoS Attacks: A Stackelberg Game Analysis
ABSTRACT This article presents an optimal power scheduling strategy for cyber‐physical systems (CPS) vulnerable to denial‐of‐service (DoS) attacks. Departing from conventional Nash equilibrium approaches, we establish a Stackelberg game framework to model the strategic interactions between a multi‐type defender and a multi‐type attacker under information asymmetry, where both parties possess only probabilistic estimates of each other's total power resources. The work systematically develops optimal defense and attack strategies and proposes a Quantum‐behaved Particle Swarm Optimization (QPSO) algorithm to efficiently solve the resulting nonlinear, non‐convex optimization problem. To validate this method, we evaluated it in terms of rewards and convergence rates. Comprehensive simulation validates the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed approach.
Authors
- Xudong Zhao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1864-4686)
- Wei Xing (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2841-7206)
- Junfeng Zhang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1335-6682)
- Shan Xue (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9123-5133)
- Jiamu pan
Institutions
- Hainan University (CN)
- Dalian University of Technology (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Asian Journal of Control
- Published
- 2026-11-15
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1002/asjc.70301
- Primary Topic
- Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00