Swarm intelligence in the evolution of cooperation: a brief survey
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation among self-interested individuals remains a central issue in evolutionary biology and social science. The development of swarm intelligence provides a new perspective for understanding how local interactions and adaptive strategy updating shape macroscopic cooperative dynamics. This paper presents a brief survey of swarm intelligence in the evolution of cooperation, with particular attention to swarm-intelligence-based strategy updating in social dilemma games. We examine how representative swarm-intelligence mechanisms incorporate individual, social, and historical information into strategy adaptation, and how such information integration reshapes evolutionary dynamics and cooperative outcomes. We also summarize the common features and current limitations of existing models and discuss several promising directions for future research.
Authors
- Qionglin Dai (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6120-4689)
- Wei Zhang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0749-1204)
- 李海红
- Changwei Huang
- Shun Gao
Institutions
- The University of Sydney (AU)
- Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (CN)
- Guangxi University (CN)
- Sichuan Agricultural University (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Frontiers in Physics
- Published
- 2026-11-16
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3389/fphy.2026.2019543
- Primary Topic
- Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00