Owning the Gap: How Observers Judge the Distance Between What People Say They Want and What They Do

Observers evaluate more than what people achieve. They also evaluate how people stand toward the distance between an aspiration and their conduct. This paper proposes gap ownership as a construct for that stance. It follows Weber's ideal-type method as extended by Etzrodt. Three types are derived from two questions: whether the aspiration is kept, and whether the actor accepts authorship of the gap. In the owned gap, the actor answers for the distance. In the disowned gap, the actor keeps the aspiration, does not live it, and places its failure outside the self. In the dissolved gap, each aspiration is replaced before it is acted on. The last two correspond to the alienation and anomie poles in Etzrodt's reading of Weber. For a fixed gap, observers' respect, irritation, contempt, and discounting are predicted to depend on the stance, whatever the desirability of the aspiration. The claim has a domain. For obligations to others, a good excuse softens the listener. For self-regarding aspirations the paper predicts the reverse: answering for the gap earns more respect than explaining it away. Seven propositions carry refutation conditions, and rival predictions separate ownership from behavioral integrity, false signaling, listener burden, and the controllability of excuses.

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Publication Details

Journal
PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Published
2026-11-15
DOI
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/mq7v6
Primary Topic
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Type
preprint
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preprint

Owning the Gap: How Observers Judge the Distance Between What People Say They Want and What They Do

Shiyun Zhang Isabelle
PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
preprint

Owning the Gap: How Observers Judge the Distance Between What People Say They Want and What They Do

Shiyun Zhang Isabelle
preprint en

Abstract

Observers evaluate more than what people achieve. They also evaluate how people stand toward the distance between an aspiration and their conduct. This paper proposes gap ownership as a construct for that stance. It follows Weber's ideal-type method as extended by Etzrodt. Three types are derived from two questions: whether the aspiration is kept, and whether the actor accepts authorship of the gap. In the owned gap, the actor answers for the distance. In the disowned gap, the actor keeps the aspiration, does not live it, and places its failure outside the self. In the dissolved gap, each aspiration is replaced before it is acted on. The last two correspond to the alienation and anomie poles in Etzrodt's reading of Weber. For a fixed gap, observers' respect, irritation, contempt, and discounting are predicted to depend on the stance, whatever the desirability of the aspiration. The claim has a domain. For obligations to others, a good excuse softens the listener. For self-regarding aspirations the paper predicts the reverse: answering for the gap earns more respect than explaining it away. Seven propositions carry refutation conditions, and rival predictions separate ownership from behavioral integrity, false signaling, listener burden, and the controllability of excuses.

PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
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