With Divergence, You Can Never Break the Chain
Description This manuscript is the first public disclosure of the DA-BFT (Divergent Arbitration Byzantine Fault Tolerance) protocol applied to decentralized verification and the blockchain oracle problem. It is uploaded to establish a clear, timestamped record of authorship and priority. The paper makes three contributions specific to the decentralized setting: 1. A structural account of why threshold verification cannot detect correlated sourcing failure—honest reporters drawing on a shared substrate produce confident concordant error that counting agreement cannot distinguish from independent convergence. 2. A specification of what an on-chain execution gate must guarantee for a verified output to be safely consumed, stated as requirements (authenticity, structural admissibility, reliability grade floor, validation freshness, contestability) rather than as a mechanism, together with a constraint on incentive layers to avoid reintroducing source-prior weighting. 3. The observation that a public ledger can preserve dissent as a tamper-evident public artifact—a capability no off-chain verification log provides. The off-chain verification layer is implemented, deployed, and validated against a domain with verifiable ground truth. The on-chain execution gate is specified, not implemented; no results in the paper depend on it. The protocol is applied unmodified from its independent development; the decentralized setting contributes constraints and one capability (durable public dissent records) rather than requiring changes to the protocol itself.
Authors
- Jonathan B. Miller (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4610-0210)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-14
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24238196
- Primary Topic
- Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Type
- preprint