Religious Liberty Beyond the Preference Model: Sandel's Perspective

Michael Sandel argues that religious liberty is inadequately justified when religious commitments are assimilated to mere preferences chosen by an autonomous individual. Such an account obscures the predicament of persons who experience religious observance as an obligation constitutive of their identity. This article reconstructs Sandel’s argument through his critique of the unencumbered self and his interpretation of American religious liberty controversies. It distinguishes a phenomenological claim about conscience, a normative claim about the gravity of interference, and a substantive claim about the goods that justify religious protection. Although the first two claims expose weaknesses in voluntarist reasoning, the third risks making minority freedom dependent on prevailing assessments of religious worth. A comparison with Rawls demonstrates that liberal equality can acknowledge binding commitments without endorsing their theological foundations. The article develops a qualified Sandelian position that combines attention to lived obligation with equal standing, protection for dissent, and scrutiny of burdens imposed on others. Religious liberty consequently requires neither the reduction of faith to preference nor the authorisation of public officials to rank religions by their civic usefulness.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-15
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24239794
Primary Topic
Religious Freedom and Discrimination
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Religious Liberty Beyond the Preference Model: Sandel's Perspective

Bonnie Neihsial
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Religious Freedom and Discrimination
article

Religious Liberty Beyond the Preference Model: Sandel's Perspective

Bonnie Neihsial
article en

Abstract

Michael Sandel argues that religious liberty is inadequately justified when religious commitments are assimilated to mere preferences chosen by an autonomous individual. Such an account obscures the predicament of persons who experience religious observance as an obligation constitutive of their identity. This article reconstructs Sandel’s argument through his critique of the unencumbered self and his interpretation of American religious liberty controversies. It distinguishes a phenomenological claim about conscience, a normative claim about the gravity of interference, and a substantive claim about the goods that justify religious protection. Although the first two claims expose weaknesses in voluntarist reasoning, the third risks making minority freedom dependent on prevailing assessments of religious worth. A comparison with Rawls demonstrates that liberal equality can acknowledge binding commitments without endorsing their theological foundations. The article develops a qualified Sandelian position that combines attention to lived obligation with equal standing, protection for dissent, and scrutiny of burdens imposed on others. Religious liberty consequently requires neither the reduction of faith to preference nor the authorisation of public officials to rank religions by their civic usefulness.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Religious Freedom and Discrimination
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