Improving Lives and Avoiding Harm

ABSTRACT The Asymmetry in population ethics holds that creating a miserable person is morally impermissible, while not creating a happy person is morally permissible, all else being equal. Harm‐avoidance theories explain the Asymmetry by claiming that, in certain contexts, only actions resulting in harm are impermissible. Two problems threaten these theories: (i) The Problem of Improvable Life Avoidance—requiring agents to avoid creating improvable good lives—and (ii) requiring dominated options. Sophisticated harm‐avoidance theories avoid both problems. However, we show that any harm‐avoidance theory entails either (1) a worse form of The Problem of Improvable Life Avoidance, (2) a troubling form of sadism, (3) an implausibly extreme priority for avoiding a small harm for one person over greater harms for many people, or (4) spurious prohibition dilemmas. Furthermore, we argue that any reasonable theory of the Asymmetry entails at least one of (1)–(4).

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Publication Details

Journal
Noûs
Published
2026-11-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70074
Primary Topic
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Improving Lives and Avoiding Harm

Patrick Kaczmarek, Tim Campbell
Noûs
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
article

Improving Lives and Avoiding Harm

Patrick Kaczmarek, Tim Campbell
article en

Abstract

ABSTRACT The Asymmetry in population ethics holds that creating a miserable person is morally impermissible, while not creating a happy person is morally permissible, all else being equal. Harm‐avoidance theories explain the Asymmetry by claiming that, in certain contexts, only actions resulting in harm are impermissible. Two problems threaten these theories: (i) The Problem of Improvable Life Avoidance—requiring agents to avoid creating improvable good lives—and (ii) requiring dominated options. Sophisticated harm‐avoidance theories avoid both problems. However, we show that any harm‐avoidance theory entails either (1) a worse form of The Problem of Improvable Life Avoidance, (2) a troubling form of sadism, (3) an implausibly extreme priority for avoiding a small harm for one person over greater harms for many people, or (4) spurious prohibition dilemmas. Furthermore, we argue that any reasonable theory of the Asymmetry entails at least one of (1)–(4).

Noûs
University of St Andrews (GB), Institute for Futures Studies (SE)
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
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