EXPRESS: Dynamic Principal-Agent Problem in Queueing Systems with Customer Abandonment

Service systems in which demand, congestion, and worker incentives evolve jointly are ubiquitous in modern operations. We study a dynamic principal–agent problem in a queueing system with customer abandonment, where the principal controls arrivals through pricing and the agent privately chooses a costly service rate. Modeling workload as a controlled reflected diffusion, we characterize the centralized and decentralized Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations and construct a representative two-part contract consisting of an access charge and a completion payment. Under unrestricted transfers, the contract coordinates pricing and service to attain the first-best joint payoff. Whenever participation is feasible, it makes the agent's participation constraint bind and allocates the remaining surplus to the principal. Implementation is robust to misspecification of the service-rate function used by the principal. We also establish conditions under which the representative payment schedules are nonmonotone in workload. Extensions consider multiple agents, general patience distributions, and information disclosure in a reduced Bayesian-persuasion benchmark. Numerical examples illustrate how the effects of customer impatience on optimal pricing and service can vary with congestion.

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Publication Details

Journal
Production and Operations Management
Published
2026-11-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/10591478261510178
Primary Topic
Advanced Queuing Theory Analysis
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

EXPRESS: Dynamic Principal-Agent Problem in Queueing Systems with Customer Abandonment

Xiang Zhong, Tan Yu, Xiaohan Zhu, Tiaojun Xiao
Production and Operations Management
Advanced Queuing Theory Analysis
article

EXPRESS: Dynamic Principal-Agent Problem in Queueing Systems with Customer Abandonment

Xiang Zhong, Tan Yu, Xiaohan Zhu, Tiaojun Xiao
article en

Abstract

Service systems in which demand, congestion, and worker incentives evolve jointly are ubiquitous in modern operations. We study a dynamic principal–agent problem in a queueing system with customer abandonment, where the principal controls arrivals through pricing and the agent privately chooses a costly service rate. Modeling workload as a controlled reflected diffusion, we characterize the centralized and decentralized Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations and construct a representative two-part contract consisting of an access charge and a completion payment. Under unrestricted transfers, the contract coordinates pricing and service to attain the first-best joint payoff. Whenever participation is feasible, it makes the agent's participation constraint bind and allocates the remaining surplus to the principal. Implementation is robust to misspecification of the service-rate function used by the principal. We also establish conditions under which the representative payment schedules are nonmonotone in workload. Extensions consider multiple agents, general patience distributions, and information disclosure in a reduced Bayesian-persuasion benchmark. Numerical examples illustrate how the effects of customer impatience on optimal pricing and service can vary with congestion.

Production and Operations Management
Advanced Queuing Theory Analysis
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