Contract Form and the Persistence of Executive Discretion Over Foreign Capital in Bangladesh
Foreign investors earn returns from public contracts under every kind of government, so their presence cannot explain how much a state gives up. This article asks what does. It follows six episodes in Bangladesh's electricity sector from the late 1990s to 2026, coding each by its route into the state, the type of foreign benefit, the form of the payment commitment and the contract's later history. The argument is that concentrated authority lets a government commit public revenue quickly, and that the form of the resulting contract then sets how costly correction becomes. Vernon's obsolescing bargain predicts that leverage drifts toward the host state once capital is sunk. Take-or-pay agreements, dedicated plants and sovereign-backed credit can block that drift, so the bargain never becomes obsolete. The persistence claim is the best supported of four propositions tested. The 2024 repeal of the special procurement law left existing contracts valid, and the Godda terms were still disputed in 2026. At least 11 percent of import capacity, and at most about 28 percent, came through open competition, while a single dedicated plant accounts for 56 percent. Comparison cases from Bangladesh's rental plants, Indonesia and Pakistan show that exit came at contract expiry or at a price in compensation, haircuts or longer terms. The record supports neither a finding of policy capture nor one of illegal enrichment. It supports a narrower claim about institutional form, and about who can ask a state to think again.
Authors
- Nafiz Basher Alif (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0353-0571)
Publication Details
- Journal
- SocArXiv (OSF Preprints)
- Published
- 2026-11-14
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/a53c6_v1
- Primary Topic
- International Business and FDI
- Type
- preprint