Where Does the "I" Go? What the Absence of a Remembered Interval Does and Does Not Tell Us

After general anesthesia, a person may remember nothing between the last moment before induction and the first remembered moment after waking. It is tempting to treat this absence as evidence that something else was absent in the interval: experience, or perhaps the subject itself. This paper argues for a more limited conclusion. The absence of a remembered interval establishes a gap in retrospective access; by itself it does not establish a gap in experience or in subject presence. Three questions that ordinary language compresses into the single word "continuity" are separated: whether experience was present throughout the interval, whether a subject was present throughout it, and whether the person before and after the interval is the same person. A mathematical appendix treats continuity as an identifiability question relative to an observation channel and an admissible class of histories. If observationally indistinguishable histories differ in experiential or subject continuity, that continuity is not identifiable from the channel alone. Physiological or behavioral evidence can refine the inference, but a conclusion about subject presence requires an explicit bridge principle. No theory of consciousness is proposed: the result concerns the limits of a specified kind of evidence, not the limits of consciousness itself.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24210145
Primary Topic
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Type
preprint
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
preprint

Where Does the "I" Go? What the Absence of a Remembered Interval Does and Does Not Tell Us

Kacheong Yeung
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
preprint

Where Does the "I" Go? What the Absence of a Remembered Interval Does and Does Not Tell Us

Kacheong Yeung
preprint en

Abstract

After general anesthesia, a person may remember nothing between the last moment before induction and the first remembered moment after waking. It is tempting to treat this absence as evidence that something else was absent in the interval: experience, or perhaps the subject itself. This paper argues for a more limited conclusion. The absence of a remembered interval establishes a gap in retrospective access; by itself it does not establish a gap in experience or in subject presence. Three questions that ordinary language compresses into the single word "continuity" are separated: whether experience was present throughout the interval, whether a subject was present throughout it, and whether the person before and after the interval is the same person. A mathematical appendix treats continuity as an identifiability question relative to an observation channel and an admissible class of histories. If observationally indistinguishable histories differ in experiential or subject continuity, that continuity is not identifiable from the channel alone. Physiological or behavioral evidence can refine the inference, but a conclusion about subject presence requires an explicit bridge principle. No theory of consciousness is proposed: the result concerns the limits of a specified kind of evidence, not the limits of consciousness itself.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Laika access coming soon