Counterfactual Safety Reasoning: Post-Mission What-If Proofs for Autonomous Drones

Safety cases for autonomous drones are typically static documents, disconnectedfrom the runtime behaviour they are meant to assure. We present SCC (Safety CaseCompiler), a tool that takes safety requirements in a small DSL and compilesthem into: (i) executable Rust test stubs, (ii) Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)nodes, and (iii) cryptographic proofs in a hash chain. One source of truth (therequirements file) generates three verified artefacts. We demonstrate SCC on a3-requirement UAV envelope (speed, altitude, obstacle clearance), showing thata single-line change regenerates all artefacts and re-validates the chain. SCCis implemented in Rust (no_std compatible) and evaluated on 10 unit tests and 1end-to-end demo. We discuss how SCC integrates with the DO-326A security processand identify open problems.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24219190
Primary Topic
Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
Type
preprint
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preprint

Counterfactual Safety Reasoning: Post-Mission What-If Proofs for Autonomous Drones

Andre Oliveira
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
preprint

Counterfactual Safety Reasoning: Post-Mission What-If Proofs for Autonomous Drones

Andre Oliveira
preprint en

Abstract

Safety cases for autonomous drones are typically static documents, disconnectedfrom the runtime behaviour they are meant to assure. We present SCC (Safety CaseCompiler), a tool that takes safety requirements in a small DSL and compilesthem into: (i) executable Rust test stubs, (ii) Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)nodes, and (iii) cryptographic proofs in a hash chain. One source of truth (therequirements file) generates three verified artefacts. We demonstrate SCC on a3-requirement UAV envelope (speed, altitude, obstacle clearance), showing thata single-line change regenerates all artefacts and re-validates the chain. SCCis implemented in Rust (no_std compatible) and evaluated on 10 unit tests and 1end-to-end demo. We discuss how SCC integrates with the DO-326A security processand identify open problems.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
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