AI and the Responsibility-Bearing Status of Authorship

Abstract Generative AI has sharpened an old question: who, or what, can be an author? The central aim of this paper is to reconstruct the conception of authorship already implicit in copyright law. I argue that copyright encodes authorship as a responsibility-bearing status, constituted by a cluster of conditions: intentional agency, guided control, and relational expression (ACE). The paper’s contribution is to make that conception explicit, to show that the human-authorship rule is best understood as a proxy for those capacities, not a species predicate, and to explain why this generates a tension with recognizing current generative AI systems as authors unless one is prepared to attribute to them the thicker agential capacities ACE requires. On that basis, the paper also clarifies why AI-assisted works may still be human-authored, while some AI-generated outputs give rise to genuine authorship gaps.

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Publication Details

Journal
Philosophy & Technology
Published
2026-11-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-026-01235-w
Primary Topic
Law, AI, and Intellectual Property
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

AI and the Responsibility-Bearing Status of Authorship

Caterina Moruzzi
Philosophy & Technology
Law, AI, and Intellectual Property
article

AI and the Responsibility-Bearing Status of Authorship

Caterina Moruzzi
article en

Abstract

Abstract Generative AI has sharpened an old question: who, or what, can be an author? The central aim of this paper is to reconstruct the conception of authorship already implicit in copyright law. I argue that copyright encodes authorship as a responsibility-bearing status, constituted by a cluster of conditions: intentional agency, guided control, and relational expression (ACE). The paper’s contribution is to make that conception explicit, to show that the human-authorship rule is best understood as a proxy for those capacities, not a species predicate, and to explain why this generates a tension with recognizing current generative AI systems as authors unless one is prepared to attribute to them the thicker agential capacities ACE requires. On that basis, the paper also clarifies why AI-assisted works may still be human-authored, while some AI-generated outputs give rise to genuine authorship gaps.

Philosophy & TechnologyVol. 39(4)
University of Edinburgh (GB)
Law, AI, and Intellectual Property
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