Independent Directors and Corporate Governance in India: Role, Responsibilities and Challenges

Indian boards are rarely meetings of equals. In most of the listed companies a promoter family or group holds a controlling stake, and the directors who sit beside it were often introduced by it. Independent directors are the law's answer to that imbalance: outsiders who are meant to examine proposals without a stake in the outcome, and to speak for shareholders who have no seat of their own. This article looks at how the idea has been built into Indian law through the Companies Act, 2013 and the SEBI Listing Regulations, what those instruments ask of independent directors and what they give in return by way of a qualified shield against liability, and how the Supreme Court has approached the personal responsibility of directors. It then asks why the formal structure has not always produced real independence, pointing to promoter influence over selection, dependence on management for information, the economics of the role, and board cultures that can treat dissent as disloyalty. The article closes with reform proposals aimed less at adding rules than at changing who selects, informs and protects these directors. Its central claim is that independence should be tested by what a director can actually do in a meeting, not by how many appear on a board list.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-15
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24233818
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Independent Directors and Corporate Governance in India: Role, Responsibilities and Challenges

Srabasti Banerjee & Shreema Roy
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Corporate Finance and Governance
article

Independent Directors and Corporate Governance in India: Role, Responsibilities and Challenges

Srabasti Banerjee & Shreema Roy
article en

Abstract

Indian boards are rarely meetings of equals. In most of the listed companies a promoter family or group holds a controlling stake, and the directors who sit beside it were often introduced by it. Independent directors are the law's answer to that imbalance: outsiders who are meant to examine proposals without a stake in the outcome, and to speak for shareholders who have no seat of their own. This article looks at how the idea has been built into Indian law through the Companies Act, 2013 and the SEBI Listing Regulations, what those instruments ask of independent directors and what they give in return by way of a qualified shield against liability, and how the Supreme Court has approached the personal responsibility of directors. It then asks why the formal structure has not always produced real independence, pointing to promoter influence over selection, dependence on management for information, the economics of the role, and board cultures that can treat dissent as disloyalty. The article closes with reform proposals aimed less at adding rules than at changing who selects, informs and protects these directors. Its central claim is that independence should be tested by what a director can actually do in a meeting, not by how many appear on a board list.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Amity University (AE)
Corporate Finance and Governance
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