LOW-TRACEABILITY AERIAL THREAT: HOSTILE DRONES AGAINST PUBLIC SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

The diffusion of low-cost Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) has exposed public security institutions to a form of aggression that separates the aggressor from the physical space of the attack. The article aims to analyse Brazil’s capacity to prevent, detect, mitigate and respond to this hostile use and to propose guidelines to strengthen it. It proposes the construct low-traceability aerial threat, defined by the conjunction of remote execution, low traceability of the operator within the response window, operator mobility and low marginal cost of repetition. The qualitative design combines a problem-oriented literature review, documentary analysis of Brazilian and United States regulatory sources and a functional comparison between legal orders, complemented by an incident table with sources graded by reliability. The analysis supports three findings. The Brazilian framework, redesigned by RBAC No. 100 and ICA 100-40, organizes civil use by risk but neither governs hostile use nor creates a detection duty at sensitive facilities. The legal response is fragmented: Law No. 15,358/2026 treats drones only as an aggravating circumstance of structured social domination, and ANATEL allows security agencies to operate jammers only in previously approved areas, without operator certification or logging of activations. The recent United States regime conditions mitigation on certification, a credible-threat threshold and reporting. These elements support the hypothesis of three interdependent deficits: legislative, technological and doctrinal. Brazilian incidents between 2024 and November 2026, such as the refinement of devices, operator training by factions, the seizure of counter-drone equipment and repeated use against police, indicate that the phenomenon is no longer prospective. The article assesses the bills before Congress and formulates six normative propositions, a five-phase response protocol and a tiered equipment standard.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Revista Gênero e Interdisciplinaridade
Published
2026-11-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.51249/gei.v7i06.3314
Primary Topic
International Law and Aviation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

LOW-TRACEABILITY AERIAL THREAT: HOSTILE DRONES AGAINST PUBLIC SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Sidney de Oliveira Carvalho
Revista Gênero e Interdisciplinaridade
International Law and Aviation
article

LOW-TRACEABILITY AERIAL THREAT: HOSTILE DRONES AGAINST PUBLIC SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Sidney de Oliveira Carvalho
article en

Abstract

The diffusion of low-cost Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) has exposed public security institutions to a form of aggression that separates the aggressor from the physical space of the attack. The article aims to analyse Brazil’s capacity to prevent, detect, mitigate and respond to this hostile use and to propose guidelines to strengthen it. It proposes the construct low-traceability aerial threat, defined by the conjunction of remote execution, low traceability of the operator within the response window, operator mobility and low marginal cost of repetition. The qualitative design combines a problem-oriented literature review, documentary analysis of Brazilian and United States regulatory sources and a functional comparison between legal orders, complemented by an incident table with sources graded by reliability. The analysis supports three findings. The Brazilian framework, redesigned by RBAC No. 100 and ICA 100-40, organizes civil use by risk but neither governs hostile use nor creates a detection duty at sensitive facilities. The legal response is fragmented: Law No. 15,358/2026 treats drones only as an aggravating circumstance of structured social domination, and ANATEL allows security agencies to operate jammers only in previously approved areas, without operator certification or logging of activations. The recent United States regime conditions mitigation on certification, a credible-threat threshold and reporting. These elements support the hypothesis of three interdependent deficits: legislative, technological and doctrinal. Brazilian incidents between 2024 and November 2026, such as the refinement of devices, operator training by factions, the seizure of counter-drone equipment and repeated use against police, indicate that the phenomenon is no longer prospective. The article assesses the bills before Congress and formulates six normative propositions, a five-phase response protocol and a tiered equipment standard.

Revista Gênero e InterdisciplinaridadeVol. 7(06)
International Law and Aviation
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