The Human Game of Persuasion

Persuasion serves as a crucial instrument of human social engagement, enabling individuals, collectives, and organizations to sway ideas, attitudes, preferences, and actions. While persuasion has historically been analyzed via rhetorical theory, cognitive psychology, and communication studies, its strategic and interactive nature implies that it may also be perceived as a multifaceted human game characterized by asymmetric information, conflicting interests, emotional intelligence, social identity, and power dynamics. This article presents the notion of the Human Game of Persuasion (HGP), a comprehensive theoretical model that defines persuasion as a fluid, iterative, and contextually influenced social game. In this context, humans function concurrently as both influencers and recipients of influence, adeptly handling information, deciphering social cues, assessing trustworthiness, and reacting to perceived rewards and dangers. Utilizing Aristotle's rhetorical framework, the Elaboration Likelihood Model, social influence theory, prospect theory, signaling theory, and evolutionary perspectives on human communication, the study investigates the genesis, evolution, and impact of persuasive interactions on both individual and group decision-making. The primary contention is that persuasion cannot be sufficiently elucidated as the one-sided conveyance of impactful communications. Persuasion ought to be regarded as a mutual strategic endeavour where results hinge on cognitive evaluation, emotional reactions, relational trust, institutional authority, cultural conventions, and the perceived validity of attempts to persuade. The manuscript further suggests a formal game-theoretic framework, verifiable hypotheses, and an empirical study methodology to explore the connections between persuasive tactics, information disparity, trust, autonomy, and behavioural results. It asserts that the efficacy and moral validity of persuasion should be assessed independently. Persuasive success does not necessarily indicate reasonable agreement, informed consent, or socially beneficial consequences.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24210712
Primary Topic
Psychology of Social Influence
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

The Human Game of Persuasion

Shah Jubaer
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Psychology of Social Influence
article

The Human Game of Persuasion

Shah Jubaer
article en

Abstract

Persuasion serves as a crucial instrument of human social engagement, enabling individuals, collectives, and organizations to sway ideas, attitudes, preferences, and actions. While persuasion has historically been analyzed via rhetorical theory, cognitive psychology, and communication studies, its strategic and interactive nature implies that it may also be perceived as a multifaceted human game characterized by asymmetric information, conflicting interests, emotional intelligence, social identity, and power dynamics. This article presents the notion of the Human Game of Persuasion (HGP), a comprehensive theoretical model that defines persuasion as a fluid, iterative, and contextually influenced social game. In this context, humans function concurrently as both influencers and recipients of influence, adeptly handling information, deciphering social cues, assessing trustworthiness, and reacting to perceived rewards and dangers. Utilizing Aristotle's rhetorical framework, the Elaboration Likelihood Model, social influence theory, prospect theory, signaling theory, and evolutionary perspectives on human communication, the study investigates the genesis, evolution, and impact of persuasive interactions on both individual and group decision-making. The primary contention is that persuasion cannot be sufficiently elucidated as the one-sided conveyance of impactful communications. Persuasion ought to be regarded as a mutual strategic endeavour where results hinge on cognitive evaluation, emotional reactions, relational trust, institutional authority, cultural conventions, and the perceived validity of attempts to persuade. The manuscript further suggests a formal game-theoretic framework, verifiable hypotheses, and an empirical study methodology to explore the connections between persuasive tactics, information disparity, trust, autonomy, and behavioural results. It asserts that the efficacy and moral validity of persuasion should be assessed independently. Persuasive success does not necessarily indicate reasonable agreement, informed consent, or socially beneficial consequences.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Psychology of Social Influence
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