Same Words, Different Seats: Nominee and Independent Directors under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code after the 2026 Amendment

Company law treats nominee and independent directors as opposites: a nominee can never qualify as independent. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ("IBC" or "Code") asks the same questions of every director: what did you know, and what did you do? This article examines how that mismatch plays out after the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026 ("2026 Act"). It argues, first, that sections 19 and 66 of the Code are blind to how a director was appointed, and that the tribunal decisions reviewed here, including one involving lender-appointed nominees, decide liability on proof of intent, participation and diligence rather than on status. Second, it shows that the parts of the 2026 Act already in force (extended cooperation duties, liquidator and creditor standing to pursue trading claims, re-anchored look-back periods) raise the scrutiny on all directors, while the creditor-initiated process that would place a resolution professional inside board meetings is enacted but not yet in force. Third, it argues that the real differences between the two directors lie in loyalty, information and the evidential record, and that the Indian text of section 66(2) lacks the two-sided standard of care found in its UK counterpart. It closes with four reform proposals: recognition of nominee conflicts and a narrow recusal rule, a conditional safe harbour tied to the diligence Explanation in section 66(2), and guidance on what "ought to have known" demands of non-executive directors. The first two proposals build on Lakshita Mohan's July 2026 commentary and are attributed accordingly.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-15
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24233797
Primary Topic
Corporate Insolvency and Governance
Type
article
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article

Same Words, Different Seats: Nominee and Independent Directors under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code after the 2026 Amendment

Anushka Shaha & Riya Majumder
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Corporate Insolvency and Governance
article

Same Words, Different Seats: Nominee and Independent Directors under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code after the 2026 Amendment

Anushka Shaha & Riya Majumder
article en

Abstract

Company law treats nominee and independent directors as opposites: a nominee can never qualify as independent. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ("IBC" or "Code") asks the same questions of every director: what did you know, and what did you do? This article examines how that mismatch plays out after the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026 ("2026 Act"). It argues, first, that sections 19 and 66 of the Code are blind to how a director was appointed, and that the tribunal decisions reviewed here, including one involving lender-appointed nominees, decide liability on proof of intent, participation and diligence rather than on status. Second, it shows that the parts of the 2026 Act already in force (extended cooperation duties, liquidator and creditor standing to pursue trading claims, re-anchored look-back periods) raise the scrutiny on all directors, while the creditor-initiated process that would place a resolution professional inside board meetings is enacted but not yet in force. Third, it argues that the real differences between the two directors lie in loyalty, information and the evidential record, and that the Indian text of section 66(2) lacks the two-sided standard of care found in its UK counterpart. It closes with four reform proposals: recognition of nominee conflicts and a narrow recusal rule, a conditional safe harbour tied to the diligence Explanation in section 66(2), and guidance on what "ought to have known" demands of non-executive directors. The first two proposals build on Lakshita Mohan's July 2026 commentary and are attributed accordingly.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Amity University (AE)
Corporate Insolvency and Governance
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