Enhanced Liability and Bank Failure
Does enhanced liability for shareholders and managers reduce bank failure? We compare the performance of ~4,200 state-regulated banks of similar size in neighboring U.S. states with different liability regimes during the Great Depression. The distress rate for limited liability banks was 29% higher than for banks with enhanced liability. Results are robust to a diff-in-diff analysis incorporating nationally regulated banks (that faced the same regulations everywhere) and are not driven by other differences in regulation, local characteristics, or differential selection into state-regulated banks. Our results suggest that exposing shareholders and managers to more downside risk can substantially reduce bank failure.
Authors
- Daniel J. Barth (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9794-2752)
- Felipe Aldunate (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7641-8628)
- Haelim Park Anderson (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5385-7719)
- Arthur G. Korteweg (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1941-4655)
- Dirk Jenter (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4168-9329)
- Dong Beom Choi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1878-3942)
- Peter Koudijs (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9889-2996)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2026-11-13
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-1169-2026
- Primary Topic
- Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
- Type
- preprint