Central bank independence and inflation: a novel index and empirical application
This paper develops a new index of central bank independence (CBI) that captures both institutional and operational aspects relevant to emerging market economies. Using panel data for 18 emerging markets, we examine the relationship between CBI and inflation using static and dynamic panel models. The results suggest a negative and statistically significant relationship between CBI and inflation in several dynamic specifications, while the relationship is not evident in the static estimates. The findings also vary across CBI measures and with the wider institutional and economic environment. Inflation remains persistent in the dynamic models. Overall, the results provide some support for a relationship between central bank independence and lower inflation, while indicating that this relationship is not uniform across specifications and policy environments.
Authors
- Placide Aime Kwizera
Institutions
- Kigali Independent University (RW)
- Rwanda Development Board (RW)
- National Bank of Ukraine (UA)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Cogent Economics & Finance
- Published
- 2026-11-14
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2026.2756698
- Primary Topic
- Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00