Competitive Advertising and Market Inefficiency in the Dairy Industry: A Dynamic Bargaining Approach Using the Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Index
Abstract This study examines inefficiencies arising from advertising competition in the dairy industry, with particular emphasis on the dynamics of advertising effects, the presence of negative cross-effects, and the role of coordination mechanisms among firms. The central issue is that advertising, rather than creating net demand, often leads to business-stealing competition and beggar-thy-neighbor effects. To analyze this issue, a dynamic advertising framework is developed that incorporates advertising carryover and saturation. Within this framework, each brand’s advertising has not only a positive direct effect but also a negative effect on its competitors’ demand. The research methodology compares three decision-making scenarios – non-cooperative behavior, complete cooperation, and Nash bargaining – and introduces the Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Intensity Index as a measure of competitive inefficiency. The model is calibrated for two products, milk and cheese, and six leading brands in the Iranian market, and is estimated over the 24-month period from April 2023 to March 2025. The results indicate that, in the milk market, moving from the non-cooperative scenario to complete cooperation increases total advertising by approximately 46 %, while simultaneously reducing the Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Intensity Index from about 2.0 to 1.0; total industry profit increases by approximately 1.2 %. Within the Nash bargaining framework, the financing mechanism plays a decisive role. In particular, the ad valorem tax mechanism reduces advertising by approximately 17 % relative to complete cooperation and generates the highest industry profit and the lowest value of the Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Intensity Index, approximately 0.9. A similar pattern is observed in the cheese market, although the degree of inefficiency is greater in this product category. Overall, the findings indicate that dairy-market efficiency depends less on the level of advertising than on the quality of advertising governance and the institutional design of coordination mechanisms.
Authors
- H Shahbazi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1047-3528)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization
- Published
- 2026-11-14
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1515/jafio-2026-0025
- Primary Topic
- Merger and Competition Analysis
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00