Official Redemption and Enforcement in the Design of Government Consumption Vouchers

Abstract Consumption vouchers condition public support on eligible purchases, but holders may convert their value into cash through fictitious transactions. This paper asks how a government should combine official redemption with enforcement when it values additional consumption and faces costly enforcement. In a model with heterogeneous purchase incentives, a higher redemption rate lowers the enforcement intensity required for complete deterrence but may draw subsidy-induced purchasers away from voucher use. Additional consumption depends on purchases displaced and consumption financed by redeemed cash. Programme payments need not rise because discounted redemption may replace a full-value subsidy. Within a fully deterring regime, the optimal rate balances these consumption and fiscal effects against savings in public enforcement expenditure and other control costs. The issuer’s control of a lawful outside option makes part of the enforcement burden endogenous to entitlement design, while the choice between administrative and criminal instruments requires a separate legal assessment.

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Publication Details

Journal
Asian Journal of Law and Economics
Published
2026-11-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2026-0075
Primary Topic
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Official Redemption and Enforcement in the Design of Government Consumption Vouchers

Ruizhi Lv, Kaixuan Ma
Asian Journal of Law and Economics
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
article

Official Redemption and Enforcement in the Design of Government Consumption Vouchers

Ruizhi Lv, Kaixuan Ma
article en

Abstract

Abstract Consumption vouchers condition public support on eligible purchases, but holders may convert their value into cash through fictitious transactions. This paper asks how a government should combine official redemption with enforcement when it values additional consumption and faces costly enforcement. In a model with heterogeneous purchase incentives, a higher redemption rate lowers the enforcement intensity required for complete deterrence but may draw subsidy-induced purchasers away from voucher use. Additional consumption depends on purchases displaced and consumption financed by redeemed cash. Programme payments need not rise because discounted redemption may replace a full-value subsidy. Within a fully deterring regime, the optimal rate balances these consumption and fiscal effects against savings in public enforcement expenditure and other control costs. The issuer’s control of a lawful outside option makes part of the enforcement burden endogenous to entitlement design, while the choice between administrative and criminal instruments requires a separate legal assessment.

Asian Journal of Law and Economics
Ocean University of China (CN)
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
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