ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE BOARDROOM: REASSESSING DIRECTORS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INDIAN COMPANY LAW

Boards of directors are increasingly turning to artificial intelligence (AI) systems for forecasting, risk scoring, credit decisions, investment screening, compliance monitoring and even strategic recommendations. Indian company law, however, was drafted for a world in which human beings gather information, deliberate and decide. The Companies Act, 2013 says nothing about this. This article asks a narrow but pressing question: can a director be held liable under Section 166 of the Companies Act, 2013 for a corporate decision taken on the strength of an AI-generated recommendation? It argues that the answer is yes, but not for the reason most commentary assumes. Section 166 does not ask whether the machine was wrong; it asks whether the director was careful, honest and independent in deciding to rely on it. Liability therefore attaches to the director's process, not to the algorithm's output. A director who adopts an AI output without understanding its purpose and limits, without applying independent judgment, or without any reasoned basis for trusting it may breach the duty of care, skill and diligence under Section 166(3) and the good-faith duty under Section 166(2). Drawing on the text of Section 166, the oversight architecture of the Act and the SEBI Listing Regulations, Indian and English case law on delegation, and Delaware's oversight jurisprudence, the article proposes a five-part "Informed Reliance Test" for measuring whether reliance on AI was reasonable, and suggests targeted reforms: a statutory reliance provision, ministry guidance, and updates to the Code for Independent Directors. Drawing on Indian statutory provisions, Indian and comparative case law, and emerging regulatory guidance, the article proposes a "calibrated reliance" standard and a set of governance measures to help boards use AI without exposing themselves to avoidable liability. It concludes that existing law is more adaptable than it is often s...

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-15
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24233864
Primary Topic
Corporate Governance and Law
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE BOARDROOM: REASSESSING DIRECTORS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INDIAN COMPANY LAW

Kankana Sarkar & Shreya Podder
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Corporate Governance and Law
article

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE BOARDROOM: REASSESSING DIRECTORS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INDIAN COMPANY LAW

Kankana Sarkar & Shreya Podder
article en

Abstract

Boards of directors are increasingly turning to artificial intelligence (AI) systems for forecasting, risk scoring, credit decisions, investment screening, compliance monitoring and even strategic recommendations. Indian company law, however, was drafted for a world in which human beings gather information, deliberate and decide. The Companies Act, 2013 says nothing about this. This article asks a narrow but pressing question: can a director be held liable under Section 166 of the Companies Act, 2013 for a corporate decision taken on the strength of an AI-generated recommendation? It argues that the answer is yes, but not for the reason most commentary assumes. Section 166 does not ask whether the machine was wrong; it asks whether the director was careful, honest and independent in deciding to rely on it. Liability therefore attaches to the director's process, not to the algorithm's output. A director who adopts an AI output without understanding its purpose and limits, without applying independent judgment, or without any reasoned basis for trusting it may breach the duty of care, skill and diligence under Section 166(3) and the good-faith duty under Section 166(2). Drawing on the text of Section 166, the oversight architecture of the Act and the SEBI Listing Regulations, Indian and English case law on delegation, and Delaware's oversight jurisprudence, the article proposes a five-part "Informed Reliance Test" for measuring whether reliance on AI was reasonable, and suggests targeted reforms: a statutory reliance provision, ministry guidance, and updates to the Code for Independent Directors. Drawing on Indian statutory provisions, Indian and comparative case law, and emerging regulatory guidance, the article proposes a "calibrated reliance" standard and a set of governance measures to help boards use AI without exposing themselves to avoidable liability. It concludes that existing law is more adaptable than it is often s...

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Corporate Governance and Law
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